Hi dmb, Mark, all Yes, dmb, Pirsig and James admit truth as an aesthetic consideration but they would also agree that truth as "what is good to believe" is a normative notion. I think Mark's objection to dmb which he tries to make clear in terms of psychology versus philosophy is better put as distinguishing what typically goes into what people believe (a psychological consideration) from what _ought_ to inform what is good to believe (a philosophical one). Sure "the passions" influence people's ideas, but to what extend _should_ they do so? When Pirsig explicates the aesthetic aspect of distinguishing true beliefs from false beliefs, he doesn't give permission to believe or disbelieve a claim based on such considerations as "it would make me happy/sad if that were true" (the position dmb was pushing in the now defunct free will/determinism threads of recent months). The aesthetic that is in play with regard to truth is an _intellectual_ aesthetic which Pirsig takes pains to distinguish from social and biological aesthetics. Intellect is not outside the "affective domain." The "passions," in the sense of Quality, must be part of our philosophies about what is true or false, but there is still the question of _which_ passions should be thought of as counting in the consideration of beliefs and which should not.
For example, we certainly should not admit so-and-so's earnest belief that she just couldn't live in a world where she thought Jesus isn't the savior of all mankind as evidence in favor of the claim that Jesus is the savior of all mankind. The fact that so-and-so "shudders" at the thought of his daughter dating a black boy, does not count in favor of the truth of any propositions about the immorality of his daughter doing so. Reason is not to be thought of as divorced from the passions in general, but it is something we ought to strive to keep distinct from particular sorts of our passions. dmb seems to think that his "shuddering" should count for more than RMP would say it does, but such negative biological or social quality ought to be distinguished from intellectual quality. Best, Steve On Sat, Dec 10, 2011 at 12:45 PM, david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: > > Mark said to dmb: > ...When you bring in the psychological concepts of feelings and motives, you > are straying from philosophy and really discussing psychology, not > philosophy. This seems more like the psychology of philosophy. I could just > as easily say that that philosophical visions play a role in feelings and > motives. The question is, which do you put as the primary endeavor? Do we > explain philosophy in terms of psychology or psychology in terms of > philosophy? Which one is more important to you? It would seem that you are > trending towards the discipline of psychology. There is no need to reduce > philosophy using psychological terms. This method of encapsulating > philosophy denies the whole purpose of philosophy. > > dmb quotes Pirsig and James: > In Zen and the Art, Robert Pirsig says: > "In the past our common universe of reason has been in the process of > escaping, rejecting the romantic, irrational world of prehistoric man. It's > been necessary since before the time of Socrates to reject the passions, the > emotions, in order to free the rational mind for an understanding of nature's > order which was as yet unknown. Now it's time to further an understanding of > nature's order by re-assimilating those passions which were originally fled > from. The passions, the emotions, the affective domain of man's > consciousness, are a part of nature's order too. The central part." > > > As William James puts it - I think this is almost exactly the same sentiment, > although he is speaking to the Hegelians in particular: > "Their persistence in telling me that feeling has nothing to do with the > question, that it is a pure matter of absolute reason, keeps me for ever out > of the pale. Still seeing a that in things which Logic does not expel, the > most I can do is to aspire to the expulsion. At present I do not even aspire. > Aspiration is a feeling. What can kindle feeling but the example of feeling? > And if the Hegelians will refuse to set an example, what can they expect the > rest of us to do? To speak more seriously, the one fundamental quarrel > Empiricism has with Absolutism is over this repudiation by Absolutism of the > personal and aesthetic factor in the construction of philosophy. That we all > of us have feelings, Empiricism feels quite sure. That they may be as > prophetic and anticipatory of truth as anything else we have, and some of > them more so than others, can not possibly be denied. But what hope is there > of squaring and settling opinions unless Absolutism will hold parley on this > common gro > und; and will admit that all philosophies are hypotheses, to which all our > faculties, emotional as well as logical, help us, and the truest of which > will at the final integration of things be found in possession of the men > whose faculties on the whole had the best divining power?" > > See, traditionally, philosophers have repudiated and rejected the personal > and aesthetic factors in the construction of our philosophies. Scientific > objectivity and it's ideal of disinterested observation is just one form of > this tendency. This tendency, as James and Pirsig, is the main reason that > philosophy needs to be radically reconstructed. Re-integrating the affective > domain is part of the solution to this problem. > > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
