Hello everyone On Wed, May 1, 2013 at 4:46 PM, X <[email protected]> wrote:
> Gentlemen, > I think what Dave Morey is trying to say, mostly out of the conversation > he and > Dan were having, where Dan had stood fairly stern about static patterns > not being > experienced. (Dan was coming from the point of view of the > concepts\experience > distinction I believe (please correct me if in err)) IS understanding > that distinction > as given, begin asking the question of what we mean when we say that > pragmatic > truth is verifyable in experience. > Dan: You seem to be asking about the correspondence theory of truth: "Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact." http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/ Ron: What do we mean when we say concepts "agree" with "experience"? Dan: It appears (to me) that you are using the term "experience" in its obvious way... we (as subjects) experience the world (of objects) that exist separately and apart from us. Robert Pirsig explains this quite nicely here: RMP Annotation 57 In the MOQ time is dependent on experience independently of matter. Matter is a deduction from experience. DG: Could you elaborate on what you mean by “independently of matter”? I can see that time is dependent on experience but am having a difficulty with the rest of your first sentence, especially in the context of your second sentence. RMP: I think the trouble is with the word, “experience.” It can be used in at least three ways. It can be used as a relationship between an object and another object (as in Los Angeles experiencing earthquakes.) It is more commonly used as a subject-object relationship. This relationship is usually considered the basis of philosophic empiricism and experimental scientific knowledge. In a subject-object metaphysics, this experience is between a preexisting object and subject, but in the MOQ, there is no pre-existing subject or object. Experience and Dynamic Quality become synonymous. Change is probably the first concept emerging from this Dynamic experience. Time is a primitive intellectual index of this change. Substance was postulated by Aristotle as that which does not change. Scientific “matter” is derived from the concept of substance. Subjects and objects are intellectual terms referring to matter and nonmatter. So in the MOQ experience comes first, everything else comes later. This is pure empiricism, as opposed to scientific empiricism, which, with its pre-existing subjects and objects, is not really so pure. I hope this explains what is said above, “In the MOQ time is dependent on experience independently of matter. Matter is a deduction from experience.” DG: Yes, this does help, thank you. What bothers me slightly—I am sure I am not seeing it in the proper light yet—is how experience can be synonymous with Dynamic Quality? Isn’t experience that which we define? RMP: Dynamic Quality is defined constantly by everyone. Consciousness can be described is a process of defining Dynamic Quality. But once the definitions emerge, they are static patterns and no longer apply to Dynamic Quality. So one can say correctly that Dynamic Quality is both infinitely definable and undefinable because definition never exhausts it. Dan comments: This is what the discussion between David H./David M. and myself has centered upon. Both Davids insist that we experience pre-existing pattens of value. This is the common way of using the term 'experience' as Robert Pirsig states: a subject/object relationship. It would appear to me that the correspondence theory of truth uses this same definition of experience. In the MOQ, however, experience becomes synonymous with Dynamic Quality. There are no pre-existing patterns of value, or a pre-existing subject/object relationship. Ron: > I think what Dave M is asking, and deducing, is that there must be a sort > of relatedness > our concepts MUST share with DQ in order for Pragmatic truths to exist. > Dan: Well, if you have followed me so far, it is clear that concepts emerge from experience, which in the MOQ becomes synonymous with Dynamic Quality. So to say our concepts MUST share with Dynamic Quality is to misunderstand the nature of the MOQ. Dynamic Quality is pre-conceptual. This is why I have been a bit 'stern' (as you put it) in holding to this notion. By introducing pre-existing concepts, patterns of value, objects, what have you, to the MOQ we are effectively landing right back into a subject/object relationship. I understand it is common knowledge that the world has existed before our experience of it. Perhaps that is why this is so hard to wrap one's mind around. It pisses people off to be told everything they know about the reality of the world is mistaken. How can that be? they holler. They make all manner of arguments to uphold their cherished ideals. They will clutch at any straw twisting it for their own benefit. But if a person carefully considers this, they will come to the conclusion that it can be no other way. It is a high quality idea to believe the world exists before experience and will continue to exist afterwards. But this is an idea, nothing more. It cannot be verified one way or another. > Ron: > Or else what the heck are we really saying about precision and clarity. > Dan: If the past is any indication of precision and clarity, I expect you will now call me all manner of foul names and tell me how ignorant I am. I am not at all sure why I am answering this post other than to perhaps enlighten those who are on the fence here. Thank you, Dan http://www.danglover.com Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
