Hi Ham, Pardon the slow response; it got busy around here.
> J: I know you don't. It's not on that level that they are co-dependent. >> It's at the level of definition and conceptualization - the 4th level. The >> individual cannot "see" (conceive) himself except in the context of a >> society. For the individual, the society is it's other, else which there >> is no being. >> >> No being for either. For without a real self, an individual - a society >> is >> not a being either. If there is no individuality at all, then everything >> is an individual one - made of constituent parts - your essential way of >> looking at things I think? And all this is just variants of self-other, >> subject object philosophy if we don't heed that all-important third - the >> value between the individual and the society. That values-between is >> what the MoQ is about. >> > > OK, I think I see the problem, John. Basically it concerns 'selfness' vs. > 'otherness'. These are the terms by which I designate the subject/object > duality. 'Being' itself is a mental construct of experiential sense data, > which means that without sensibility there is no Being -- neither objective > (societal) nor subjective (personal). > John: Ok, I get you there - the fallacy of Descartes - he postulates thinking without sensing, which is illogical and proves being then through thinking. An absurdity! Ham: > As you see, that leaves Sensibility as the metaphysical foundation of > Beingness. What is sensibility, you ask? Essentially, it's the capacity > to realize Value. What value does it realize? As I have just eliminated > everything else in existence, by logical necessity sensibility must be the > individual's valuistic realization of the essential Source. And there you > have the essentialist paradigm of reality. > > John: I come to the conclusion that while Sensibility is the foundation for Beingness, Beingness is also the foundation for Sensibility - they are codependent. This was just mentioned in response to Craig - Bob Lanza's theory of the Biocentric Universe makes the most sense to me so far, cosmologically speaking. > John: > > What is tiresome to me, are those who conclude from the significance of >> valuation, that it completely negates it's creations - the individual and >> his society. They are positive creations, not negates. NOT (not this, >> not >> that) something, not nothing and a distinction arising from betterness. >> >> To assert that there is no self is to undo all that good value. >> > > I understand. But what you don't understand is that realizing relational > values does not negate Essential Value; it negates the otherness of the > being perceived. This is how we enter it into consciousness as a thing, a > person, an object, a system, a society, or whatever. John: Ok, I think I get you there. It negates the *absolute* otherness. There is a relative otherness that is useful and creative, don't you think? Ham: > Those valuistic precepts of being are retained in the conscious mind of > the self (a negate) which, in effect, negates their otherness while > "creating" (affirming) the 'values-between' as they apply to Essence. > (This amounts to a "double negation", which is admittedly a mind teaser, > but so is the whole mystery of creation!) > > Ham. previously: > > Nor do I believe, as Andre apparently does, that "There is a moral code >> that establishes the supremacy of social order over biological life ... >> [and] moral codes over the social order." In other words, I don't believe >> in a world that is moral by divine or executive fiat. For, if that were >> so, there would be no quest for moral virtue, no human need to >> discriminate between the good, the bad, and the indifferent. >> > > J: Well there I think Andre is right and you are wrong. Moral virtue >> *is*a quest because reality *is* a moral order. The fact that morality >> >> includes bad and indifferent, must be a good thing, because it plainly >> is. > The problem of evil is practically unsolvable unless we accept that >> those > evils instruct us in the wisdom of our struggle for the good. I >> hate to get > into that subject, it's one that Royce and James struggled >> bitterly over >> and I can't imagine what to add to their arguments. >> > > Ham: > What I object to is the "dictates" inference of "supremacy of social order > over biology." There is no such supremacy, and certainly no "moral order" > which we are obliged to follow. Aside from the laws of Nature, which are > how we define intelligent design, man is free to choose his values and > subscribe to whatever morality system strikes his fancy. The very purpose > of our existence is to realize and select those sensible values which > represent our finite perspective of Absolute Essence. > > John: Hmmm. That makes sense. Does your Absolute Essence equate to Total Experience? If not, why? And if so, it seems you and the MoQ ought to be reconcilable. > > Ham: > >> If this is Pirsig's vision of the universe, he is sorely mistaken. It is >> my belief that we exist in an amoral universe, and that man is granted >> value sensibility for the specific purpose of realizing and defining >> Essential Value in relational terms. >> > > John: > > Granted by whom? It must be some kind of higher moral authority doing >> the granting, Ham, so how can you assert so assuredly that our universe >> is amoral? I don't get the reasoning behind that conclusion one bit. >> > > Take a good guess, John. Man is his own "moral authority", John: Oops! I take it back. Ham: > so I resent the inference that the absolute Source of our existence is > "some higher moral authority". Created beings are negates of this > uncreated Source, which makes their existence transitional as opposed to > ultimate or eternal. > Unfortunately, Mr. Pirsig chose to avoid defining his DQ as the primary > source, thus making the MoQ a less significant thesis, and the individual a > less meaningful entity. than they might have been. > > Hopefully the points I've elaborated above will help to resolve some of > the inconsistencies in your SOM definition (viz-a-viz "Philosophical > Realism"?) > John: Sadly, no. I can't quite follow you there. And it wasn't actually my definition, it was whomsoever published the wikipedia entry. But thanks sincerely for the effort Ham. Always a pleasure, John Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
