Near the end of Lila Pirsig narrates Phaedrus' encounter with Lila's
abandoned doll. It's relatively brief in terms of the whole book, but it
seems to have been important to Pirsig. It also raises the question of
"acquired quality". Can objects sometimes have, or acquire, quality? Here
are some ideas I wrote about the passage and the idea. I'd like your
thoughts about it.
1. "Acquired" Quality
It would be easy to skip over the narrative sequence about
Lila's abandoned doll.[1] But to do so would be to ignore an opportunity
for discovery about Pirsig and about MOQ reality.
The situation may be fictional, but I believe it was important
to Pirsig to include it in the narrative, both for its symbolism and for
personal reasons. I think his writing about it made it real for him, and I
believe that he would "feel" the sadness of that abandoned doll and would
honor it with a respectful departure.
Do "things" have feelings? That has always been an important
question for me, and I have always answered, "Yes". A closely related
question is, "Do 'things' have Quality?" That question was one horn of the
original dilemma that led to Pirsig's "discovery" and development of the
philosophy of Quality. He answered, "No". If Quality is a property of
"objects", why can't we detect it and measure it scientifically? So he had
to say, "No". But now here he says:
"Something about this doll was giving it all kinds of Quality the
manufacturer had never built into it. Lila had overlaid a whole set of value
patterns on top of it and those values were still clinging to it. It was
almost like some religious idol."[2]
You can explain it away by saying that this was just a
convenient way of saying that "Quality was in the immediate flux of
experience that created Phaedrus' reality in which this doll was experienced
as an inorganic pattern of value." I don't think so. I think Pirsig wrote
what he meant and meant what he wrote. There's something about writing
about an experience that makes it real. There's something about a person
sharing a personal history with an inanimate thing that makes it more than a
"thing". It takes on character and value and "feelings". It evolves. It
takes on Quality.
In light of MOQ, one can see Pirsig's response to the Quality
dilemma differently. The dilemma is a heavily loaded question. It not only
presumes SOM subjects and objects, but it presumes that the only
"properties" an "object" can have are those that are scientifically
detectable and measurable. In terms of MOQ the right answer to the dilemma
is, "Mu." "Un-ask the question." Hence, without benefit of MOQ the only
answer Pirsig could give to the question was, "No. Quality does not inhere
in the object."
Now, we have MOQ, but our everyday experience is still full of
"objects".[3] But an MOQ object is vastly different from an SOM "object".
An SOM object is detached from the "observer"; any "relationship" with the
object is forbidden. In MOQ relationship is central, because that's where
the event of primary Quality occurs. When a craftsman makes a chair and
"does not separate himself from the work so as to do it wrong", the chair is
no longer an SOM "object"; it is an MOQ object, and it is definitely imbued
with Quality and transmits Quality.
The other way an SOM "object" can become an MOQ object is
through relationship with someone who values it. The doll was not the
product of a craftsman, so it was only an SOM "object" when some child
received it. Then it may have begun to "acquire" Quality in relationship to
that child. But that relationship must have been transient, because the
doll ended up in the river. It was Lila who gave it value and significance.
In Lila's brief but intense care it became imbued with Quality.
There needs to be a word for a thing that, by being valued, has
become more than a "thing", more than an SOM "object". "Belonging". That's
it. A thing that has "belonged" to someone. It's "belonging" that gives a
doll feelings and value and Quality. It can't be measured, but you can feel
it, and that's more important than measuring. Pirsig felt it, and he
honored it. There's a world of difference between an SOM "object" and an
MOQ "belonging".
Pirsig points out another way something becomes an MOQ carrier
of Quality: Sanctification. When an object is ritualized, it is made
transcendent. It partakes of Dynamic Quality. Pirsig does not embrace
theistic religion, but he shows great understanding of it and great
reverence for all that is Dynamic in it. Oliver Cromwell, the Christian,
destroyed countless religious icons in England. Pirsig the atheist would
not have done so. Pirsig understood their meaning as symbols that pointed
beyond themselves. Cromwell saw them as idols that were substituted for
God. Perhaps both were right and moral.
Many thanks,
John L. McConnell
Home: 407-857-2004
Cell: 321-438-6301
Email: [email protected]
_____
[1] Pirsig, Robert (2013-11-06). Lila: An Inquiry Into Morals (p. 457-464).
Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
[2] Pirsig, Robert (2013-11-06). Lila: An Inquiry Into Morals (p. 458).
Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.
[3] Sure, you can't say "object" in MOQ; you have to say "static pattern of
value". But that just gets cumbersome and pedantic once you have already
agreed to MOQ as your domain of discourse. So let's just agree to say
"object" and move on.
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