[Andre]
I haven’t read the hundred odd pages von Dahlem has devoted to ZMM and the MoQ 
in their entirety (am at page 229) but, reading what she has to say from the 
perspective of this "communicative foundationalist ethics” which she thinks is 
perhaps the latest saviour but  I sincerely wonder if she understands the MoQ 
or its implications as I sense that it is beyond this narrow, advocated 
perspective. All I read is an attack on the intellectual level (which Phaedrus 
represents) as developed in Pirsig’s MoQ. There appears to be a great 
psychological/interpersonal thing going on from the S/O perspective and there 
appears to be little by way of interpersonal relationship understanding from 
the MoQ perspective.

Am interested to hear your comments/thoughts. Perhaps I completely 
misunderstand.

[Arlo]
Like you, I am making my way through this. Bearning in mind that this is NOT a 
dissertation on Pirsig's philosophy (as is Ant's), I was reading it with less 
scrutiny, perhaps. So, I've went back and reread the author's introduction and 
conclusions several times. I don't see the misunderstandings you imply above 
(can you give specific instances in the text where you read this?). 

I will say, it seems to me the author generally stays within Pirsig's 
epistemological narrative, and although she evokes LILA (at length), she 
maintains the 'ghost' position throughout. That is, her overall concern with 
the communicative foundation (social-cultural origins) of 'reality'. So, as I 
read it, she is not interested in reifying the MOQ's levels as much as she is 
interested in using Pirsig's understanding of the (language)-mediated nature of 
thought to help argue for the inherent communicative nature of 'ethics'. That 
is (as I am reading it), her primary term "communicative foundationalist 
ethics" could be restated along the lines of "social-foundational intellect". 
Its this border between the social and intellectual that's she's playing around 
with, and showing that the 'universal ground' for all intellectual activity is 
social (for her, communicative) activity.

And, keep in mind that while we could go into great depth over semiosis and 
where/how/when it appears (or is ubiquitous) with the MOQ, and this is fertile, 
interesting ground, but her context here is not that, and I don't think its 
fair to fault her for that. Whether you want to tease apart her notion of 
"communicative" from Pirsig's general "social", I think her points are solid in 
context. 

That said, one criticism I would make is that she seems to imply a 
Lacanian-esque view that could, if taken to its extreme, imply something like 
'a metaphysics of pure semiosis'. Her way out, here, is to use literary 
narratives that ground her ideas in a more 'lived' manner than her thesis alone 
would seem to suggest. 

But, this is still just a cursory read on my part. To be fair, apart from 
Habermas, many of the voices she evokes to build this are ones that I am 
unfamiliar with. So I could be (re)constructing her ideas in ways she did not 
intend. I was thinking of reaching out to her, not until I feel I am fairly 
satisfied that I can with her about her thesis intelligently. Or, maybe an 
informal Q/A via Ant or Horse? 

Anyways, my initial thoughts...  

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