Dan, Adrie, all,
Thanks for your replies.
The question I'm asking is what do *we* use to identify pattern type.
If what I'm suggesting here is wrong we're all heretics already!
Unless we start taking DNA tests. I know one website, 23andme.com. You
can send them your saliva and they'll analyze it and tell you whether
you're human, if you don't already know. But you already know that and
I'm asking you: how do you know?
I'm directing your attention to a more direct way of experience than
that of a scientist.
Lainaus Dan Glover <daneglo...@gmail.com>:
Tuukka,
On Sat, Jul 16, 2016 at 6:42 AM, <m...@tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
Dan, all,
Tuukka:
What wouldn't be a living thing? Would you consider the sun to be
dead?
Althought I don't know, I suppose you mightn't.
Dan:
I see the sun is a living thing just as the Earth. The inorganic
patterns making up the sun are the molecules, however, just as are the
inorganic patterns making up the guitar, and us, are molecules.
Whether or not they are alive, the molecules, is open to debate,
though for the sake of clarity it seems best to use DNA as the basis
for biological patterns.
Tuukka:
Well, the sun doesn't contain DNA. According to Pirsig life is carbon
chemistry. I take that to mean chemical reactions, so DNA isn't necessarily
living if it's just sitting in some vial on a shelf. But anyway, if we use
DNA as the basis for biological patterns, what does that mean? Suppose
you're sitting in a room with three people and a dog. How do you use DNA as
a basis for developing a model of that room?
Dan:
I think DNA is a useful distinction when delineating biological level
patterns from inorganic patterns. On the other hand, life has
implications beyond biological patterns. We might talk about living
stars vs dead stars or living cultures vs dead cultures. So when I say
the sun is alive, I don't mean it is a biological pattern. I mean it
is dynamic rather than static.
In my model it's simple. There are five biological patterns in the room and
they can be identified with the senses. But in your model it's not simple,
because you have to find DNA somewhere before identifying a single
biological pattern, and you need a laboratory in order to do that. Your
solution only looks simple on paper.
Dan:
In a sense (:-)) the senses are our gateway to the world. They the
senses inform us of the value of reality. And so yes they do inform us
of biological patterns yet (as I think we agree) the MOQ is a set of
intellectual patterns worthy of investigating more deeply than senses
alone allow. Like science.
Tuukka:
The model of value accumulation is yet another intellectual pattern.
The MOQ says that knowledge is derived from experience and my point is that
people were able to tell biological patterns from inorganic ones already
before DNA was discovered. And the question I'm trying to answer is: how did
they do that?
Dan:
Did biological and inorganic patterns exist before Robert Pirsig gave
us the MOQ?
Tuukka:
Pirsig writes that the ancient Egyptians were social whereas the Greek
were intellectual, but the MOQ wasn't invented back then. So I guess
rocks were inorganic and dinosaurs biological, too.
The guitar isn't inorganic when Leonard Cohen inhales the fragrance
of its
living wood. But that life is given to the wood by Cohen himself.
The notion of inorganicity may seem paradoxical since we as observers
of
inorganic patterns are anyhow biological patterns and can perform
the act of
observing an inorganic pattern only by making it a part of our
cognition,
thus turning it alive.
Dan:
The wood is living. It contains DNA. That life isn't 'given' to it,
the wood, by Leonard Cohen or by anyone.
Tuukka:
Most people would say the wood is dead. There's lacquer all over it and no
water except for atmospheric humidity. Pirsig wrote biologicality is "carbon
chemistry", not "inert carbon compounds".
When Cohen inhales the fragrance of his guitar's living wood the
guitar
serves him as an instrument of self-reflection. He doesn't play the
strings
but the guitar plays his mind, reminding him of the day he bought it.
We may call inorganic patterns inorganic to emphasize the fact that
they can
so easily be separated from what makes them alive.
Fingernails are biological patterns but fingernail clippings aren't.
The
difference isn't about something one can observe by putting a
fingernail
under a microscope. It's about the fact that even though the
clippings don't
come with us as we go we assume that they remain in existence after
being
discarded. That we remain able to perceive them even if we wouldn't
use them
for anything and even if they didn't remind us of anything.
Dan:
Fingernail clippings ARE biological patterns. They contain DNA. The
molecules making up the fingernail clippings are inorganic patterns.
Tuukka:
For a scientist, fingernail clippings could be quite biological. Same goes
for hair. But the Indians used human hair for making clothes. Does this mean
those articles of clothing were biological patterns?
Dan:
Yes. Just as cotton and wool are biological patterns. On the other
hand, synthetic materials like nylon and rayon are inorganic patterns.
Tuukka:
Okay, but even if they're biological I don't know how they accumulate
biological value, so I guess they don't "accumulate" that. Unless
someone thinks of a way.
Of course, plants accumulate value by growing, at least in some sense.
Maybe all patterns accumulate value but then I'm not sure how to make
sure the inorganic level will not accumulate more value than the
biological one. I'll have to think about that.
Maybe, if an inorganic pattern accumulates value as the extension of a
biological pattern, it simply retains the value.
Come to think of it, even in my current model the inorganic level can
have more value than the biological if the biological level has
negative value and a biological pattern uses an inorganic pattern to
do something good. Perhaps I have to measure value here so that it
never has negative value. Yeah, that would seem to work.
Do you see what I'm aiming at? In everyday life it doesn't matter whether an
article of clothing is made from synthetic fibres or human hair. It's still
an article of clothing. It's an object. It doesn't walk around on its own
and it doesn't breathe, and so on. I just think this kind of a division
between the inorganic and the biological is more in accord with everyday
common sense use of language than focusing on the point that clothes made of
human hair contain DNA. Who cares about that? And why?
Dan:
First of all, it is okay to use subject/object terminology as long as
it is remembered that those terms stand for patterns of value. Second,
we are discussing the MOQ and its terminology, which may or may not
differ from everyday terminology. Is blood a biological pattern? It
doesn't walk around and breathe. How about organs awaiting transplant?
A heart, or a set of lungs? Kidneys? Are those biological patterns?
Tuukka:
Well, they're *parts* of a biological pattern.
Who cares? Well, maybe no one. On the other hand, people still seem to
be reading Robert Pirsig and discussing his work. So maybe a few
people care. I know I care enough to be working out this reply to you.
I mean, I could just say the hell with it. I've got better things to
do. But I care. And too, it has been my experience, sometimes sad)
that common sense ain't all that common. Truthfully.
Tuukka:
You can't seriously believe I, out of all people, intended to
trivialize metaphysics.
And, if DNA were the only proper way to define biologicality, how did people
tell living things from inorganic things before DNA was invented?
Dan:
Or before the MOQ was invented?
Tuukka:
If we want to build an artificial intelligence based on the model of
value accumulation we have to know what that more arcane way is.
That's what brought us this far eventually, so the AI should walk the
same path in order to seem human.
A pacemaker isn't a biological pattern when it's sitting on the table
but
it's a biological pattern when in use.
Dan:
No. A pacemaker has never been alive. It does not now nor will it ever
contain DNA.
We have the notion of inorganic pattern for referring to things that
could
serve as extensions of many different biological patterns. When we
were at
the pier the guitar was an extension of the woman playing it but
had someone
else played it afterwards the guitar would've turned into an extension
of
that other person. That doesn't mean the woman who played the guitar
would've also turned into that other person's extension. Only the
guitar
changes with regards to whose extension it is.
Dan:
I think this tends to confuse the issue. Extensions.
Tuukka:
But in your model you have to find DNA before identifying a pattern as
biological, and you need a laboratory for that. Doesn't *that* confuse the
issue?
Dan:
Well, take the search for extraterrestrial life. Probes've been sent
to various and numerous moons and planets in search of other living
organisms. And so if that extraterrestrial life is ever discovered,
how will we know it is really life?
Tuukka:
DNA, I suppose. But according to what criteria do we take the DNA
sample? We don't take a sample of something that's obviously a rock.
An inorganic pattern has instrumental value when a biological
pattern
uses
it to actualize a choice it has made. Obviously, this doesn't mean
the
guitar should be discarded after the song is over. Forgetting the
guitar
on
the pier and and thus exposing it to the elements would've been a
bad
choice. But as far as we are concerned of quality, the guitar
inherently
has
none. The reason for bringing it back in and taking care of it lies
in
the
value of songs we'll play in the future, but preparing for the
future
this
way is an intellectual pattern. It doesn't mean the guitar would
inherently
have quality.
Dan:
No but see the guitar does have value! Even if I were to agree with
you, which I don't, that the guitar is only an inorganic pattern, it
is a pattern of VALUE! See what I think you are doing is mistaking a
thing as having quality instead of it the thing being quality.
Tuukka:
I am not claiming that the guitar is only an inorganic pattern. I am
merely
emphasizing the inorganic aspect of the guitar in order to illustrate
a
metaphysical point. The guitar, as the extension of a guitar
player, is also
biological.
Dan:
But if we begin extending values like this, aren't we destroying the
power of the MOQ?
Tuukka:
What is the tradeoff here? Is it that it's pleasantly simple to define life
as "containing DNA" or "carbon chemistry"? I agree it sounds simple but
wouldn't that mean life didn't exist before the discovery of DNA or the
discovery of chemistry?
Dan:
Life as we know it.
How does a dog tell the man from the stick? It doesn't matter to the dog
that both contain DNA. I agree that the stick is biological metaphysically,
but it's not biological with regards to value accumulation.
Dan:
I am not a dog so I cannot answer your question. However, I do know
how to tell a stick from a dog.
I wrote that "as far as we're concerned of quality, the guitar
inherently
has none". These are kind of meaningless words as Buddhist philosophy
doesn't introduce essences, that is, things that would inherently have
value.
By saying that I just tried to express that since the guitar doesn't
make
decisions, attributing value to it doesn't change its behavior,
whereas
attributing value to a person might change that person's self-image
and thus
behavior. I suppose, perhaps mistakenly, that we don't need to take an
animistic viewpoint in this discussion, unless that is what you want.
I also suppose, perhaps equally mistakenly, that we don't subscribe to
essentialism. You indeed seem to be suggesting the guitar essentially
has
value, but the question is, what do you intend to do with that value
apart
from using it to disagree with my previous post?
Dan:
Not exactly. No, I am not saying the guitar essentially has value. I
am saying that is not the proper way to approach the question Value,
or quality, has the guitar. Remember how Rigel asks: Does Lila have
quality? And the answer Phaedrus came up with was yes. But as he
considered things, he realized how quality has Lila, and how Rigel's
question was based on the faulty assumption that patterns have quality
rather than patterns are quality.
Tuukka:
While I'm inclined to think both of these are manners of speaking rather
than metaphysical truths, I see no need to object to this. So, the guitar is
quality.
Dan:
Ah. Excellent.
The model I'm presenting here doesn't contradict physics, but it's a
model
of value, not a model of atoms and molecules. The guitar consists of
atoms
and molecules, which are value, but people don't perceive them, just
the
guitar, so the atoms and molecules are intellectual patterns. Do you
feel
the need to use these intellectual patterns to disagree with my
previous
post?
It isn't clear to me what you mean by suggesting I mistake a thing
having
quality to a thing being quality. Everything is quality, so the notion
of
"everything is quality" doesn't help in analysis, which basically
means
splitting a whole into smaller parts. You can't split a whole into
smaller
parts according to an attribute that is shared by every single part.
You
know this, and I know the MOQ is more than analysis. But I don't see
any
other way to solve the problems Pirsig mentions in the Turner letter
except
analysis.
Dan:
What I am attempting to do here is lay the groundwork, so to speak,
for further exploration into the MOQ. For instance, you said the
guitar has no quality as it, the guitar, does not make decisions. You
might say the same thing about a head of lettuce. The head of lettuce
has no quality because it just sits there making no decisions. Quality
is only imbued to lettuce when someone eats it just as quality is only
imbued to the guitar when someone plays it.
So when I say I think you're confusing having quality with being
Quality, what I am trying to say is that the guitar doesn't have
quality so much as it is Quality. See, if we start with a faulty
assumption, then we are forced into falling back onto the notion that
since everything is quality we cannot analyze it. Quality. Sort of a
ZMM assumption. In a way. But that is exactly what the MOQ is all
about. Analyzing quality. And in a sense you are right. We can never
completely analyze Quality. The process goes on and on.
Tuukka:
And I'm trying to explicate what kind of quality is the guitar. And since
knowledge is derived from experience in the MOQ someone has to perceive the
guitar in order for it to be quality.
Dan:
But isn't that so for the universe in general? When the story stops,
so does the universe.
Tuukka:
Yeah. Quality is modeled by the mind, and the mind is biological.
Biological patterns accumulate value according to the choices
they make.
This is because biological patterns may have volition, which makes
it
possible to attribute the value of a choice to the pattern that
made the
choice. This value is inherent to the biological pattern in the
sense
that
it stays with the biological pattern even after the choice has
already
been
made.
Dan:
Do you really believe biological patterns have volition? I can't see
it. Biological patterns are constrained into a specific set of
parameters which disable them, the biological patterns, from going
outside those parameters. So really the volition or choice that
biological patterns 'have' isn't that so much as being had by the
quality that both surrounds them, the biological patterns, and
permeates them, simultaneously making it seem as if free will exists,
which of course it does, but only seem to. So in essence this tends
to
render your argument null and void if one follows said reasoning
above
to its logical conclusion.
Tuukka:
I might understand the concept of volition in a much more mundane
sense as
what you're aiming at. I understand volition simply as something
like, if a
rock is about to roll off a cliff and hit someone, the rock will
not stop if
you tell it that rolling off the cliff would have bad consequences.
But if a
person were about to push that rock off the cliff he might stop if
you told
him there's someone down below. Of course this kind of "volition" is
an
illusion, it's just an illusion that happens to be helpful.
Frankly, I can't parse the sentence: "So really the volition or
choice that
biological patterns 'have' isn't that so much as being had by the
quality
that both surrounds them, the biological patterns, and permeates them,
simultaneously making it seem as if free will exists, which of course
it
does, but only seem to."
Dan:
Yeah, I can understand the difficulty here. Sometimes sentences get
away from me and I have to whip them back into shape. What I seem to
be saying is that 'having' volition is something like 'having'
quality, that free will exists, just as biological patterns have
quality. But as you say, that is only an illusion. Free will only
seems to exist just as we only seem to have quality.
Tuukka:
Fair enough. Like I said, the concept of free will is unnecessary. I only
used it because I thought it'd be helpful, not because I'd be attracted to
the concept itself. I also take this to mean that, in the context of value
accumulation, volition *is* biologicality. Perhaps not so in another
context. I don't want to contradict Pirsig, just explain things he didn't.
Value accumulation.
Dan:
Yes, I can see that. But can't we say the same of social and
intellectual patterns?
Tuukka:
The volition of social and intellectual patterns manifests via
biological patterns.
Regards, Tuk
Dan:
Good. This is a good beginning.
Tuukka:
Yeah, and now that I'm on MD I have another good reason for waking up in the
morning. :)
Dan:
This makes me smile. Which is good. Smiling. Thanks, Tuukka.
Dan
http://www.danglover.com
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