Dear Dmb, Tuk,  

I don't think this contradicts anything in the MoQ as I understand it. I 
remember in Lila the anaology of a computer system is given. The software on 
the screen isn't the 101 in the hardware. But software is limited by the 
capabilities of the hardware.  

Similarly the capabilities of the human subject is limited by the capabilities 
of the human brain. At the end of the scale would be those with extreme mental 
disorders and I'm sure varying shades of grey between..  

On 19 October 2016 at 10:34:09 am, david 
( wrote:

> Hello Tuk:
> To say that social and intellectual quality are subjective, as Pirsig does, 
> is to offer a simple explanation of the MOQ using terms that will be 
> understood by most people. It's a way of showing how the new map (MOQ) can be 
> laid over the old map (SOM), so to speak. But of course Pirsig's MOQ 
> displaces or replaces SOM so that subjects and objects are no longer taken as 
> ontological categories, no longer taken as the starting points of reality. 
> They're just concepts into which people in our culture sort their 
> experiences, just thought categories into which we place actual phenomenal 
> realities. In this way, subjects and objects can still have a place within 
> the overall structure but they've been drastically reduced in rank, so to 
> speak.
> One of the central flaws of SOM is the low status it confers on feelings, 
> values, emotions, preferences and such because they're "just" subjective, 
> they're "just" what you like. But the MOQ insists that values are as real as 
> rocks and trees and what's most real is the primary empirical reality, a.k.a. 
> actual human experience of "inner" and "outer" realities equally.
> But it is useful as a teaching device. To say that social and intellectual 
> quality is subjective helps to explain why the church of reason is not a 
> collection of buildings and books but rather a set of ideals. The distinction 
> is a good one, even if it's not a distinction between two kinds of 
> fundamental substances.
> There's my two cents. Hope it helps.
> ________________________________
> From: Moq_Discuss <> on behalf of 
> <>
> Sent: Saturday, October 15, 2016 7:23 AM
> To:
> Subject: [MD] To Pirsig and all: Why are sociality and intellectuality 
> strictly subjective?
> All,
> As I've not been endowed with Pirsig's e-mail address I thought to
> write this open letter I hope to pertain to all those who are present.
> I remember how Pirsig complained during the Baggini interview about
> Baggini not asking him about the Metaphysics of Quality, so I thought
> maybe somebody should ask something.
> In order to approach the topic of my inquiry, let's consider the
> following ZAMM quote. This quote defines subjectivity and objectivity
> and the uses of these concepts. Emphasis by me.
> "Time to get on with the Chautauqua and the second wave of
> crystallization, the metaphysical one. This was brought about in
> response to Phædrus' wild meanderings about Quality when the English
> faculty at Bozeman, informed of their squareness, presented him with a
> reasonable question: ``Does this undefined `quality' of yours exist in
> the things we observe?'' they asked. ``Or is it subjective, existing
> only in the observer?'' It was a simple, normal enough question, and
> there was no hurry for an answer. Hah. There was no need for hurry. It
> was a finisher-offer, a knockdown question, a haymaker, a
> Saturday-night special...the kind you don't recover from. Because if
> Quality exists in the object, then you must explain just why
> scientific *instruments* are unable to detect it. You must suggest
> *instruments* that will detect it, or live with the explanation that
> instruments don't detect it because your whole Quality concept, to put
> it politely, is a large pile of nonsense. On the other hand, if
> Quality is subjective, existing only in the observer, then this
> Quality that you make so much of is just a fancy name for whatever you
> like."
> In LILA Pirsig presents the idea that social quality and intellectual
> quality are subjective. If so, how can they be detected by scientific
> *instruments*?
> We all probably can agree that BDI (Beck Depression Inventory) is an
> instrument. Yet it is a mere questionnaire - a slip of paper, on which
> the test subject selects certain answers and, according to these
> answers, the psychiatrist determines how depressed the subject is. But
> even though BDI is clearly an instrument, perhaps depression is
> biological. And if depression is biological it is objective - not
> subjective - according to the SODV stance that Pirsig already presents
> in LILA.
> If social and intellectual quality are subjective, as Pirsig claims in
> LILA and SODV, according to the above ZAMM quote instruments should be
> unable to detect them. Well, are instruments unable to detect them?
> Here's the abstract of a scientific paper at
> The Mental Health of Aboriginal Peoples: Transformations of Identity and 
> Community<>
> SAGE Publications
> "This paper reviews some recent research on the mental health of the
> First Nations, Inuit, and Métis of Canada. We summarize evidence for
> the social origins of mental health problems and illustrate the
> ongoing responses of individuals and communities to the legacy of
> colonization. Cultural discontinuity and oppression have been linked
> to high rates of depression, alcoholism, suicide, and violence in many
> communities, with the greatest impact on youth. Despite these
> challenges, many communities have done well, and research is needed to
> identify the factors that promote wellness. Cultural psychiatry can
> contribute to rethinking mental health services and health promotion
> for indigenous populations and communities."
> This is definitely about social matters, not just biological matters.
> But is this science? Scientific truth is objective. If social and
> intellectual matters are subjective, this paper is not science. Yet it
> has passed peer-review and obviously appears to be science. Obviously
> some kind of *instruments* have been used in the production of this
> scientific result. According to the LILA/SODV stance this should be
> impossible because social and intellectual patterns are subjective.
> So, what does it mean that social and intellectual values are
> subjective instead of objective? If they can be objectively detected,
> they are necessarily objective. But in the SODV paper Pirsig doesn't
> even present an overlap between the subjective and the objective. They
> are portrayed as strictly different. Why?
> Regards,
> Tuk
> Moq_Discuss mailing list
> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
> Archives:
> MOQ Online - MOQ_Discuss<>
> Robert M. Pirsig's MoQ deals with the fundamentals of existence and provides 
> a more coherent system for understanding reality than our current paradigms 
> allow
> Moq_Discuss mailing list
> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
> Archives:
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.

Reply via email to