dmb, David, all,
Tuk wrote:
The question is, if idealism and the MOQ are both bad ideas, can
idealism still be good for understanding the MOQ?
David wrote:
Why start with ?the MOQ is a bad idea?? If that is your starting
point, why should Dan or dmb or anyone bother to discuss the MOQ
with you?
Tuukka:
Pay attention! My starting points are what Pirsig wrote. See the first
post titled "The Heinous Quadrilemma". Also see the cited earlier
message at the end of that post.
"[44] RMP: It is only Dynamic Quality I think is impossible to define. I
think definition is both possible and desirable for the static levels. I
just didn't do it because these levels seemed so obvious. But in view of
all the trouble people are having, I'm doing it now in these notes."
Tukka said:
Pirsig fails to mention an important point. Static quality is also
impossible to define. I have demonstrated this with formal logic in an
article I offered to a peer-reviewed journal perhaps 2008. The journal
rejected the article on grounds of the conclusion being "obvious".
However, make no mistake! We didn't demonstrate that the theory of
static value patterns is impossible to define. It can be defined. It's
just the general notion of static value that's undefinable.
dmb says:
This is very confusing. (A) You say Pirsig fails to mention a point
that he just mentioned, (B) you contradict that point for no
apparent reason, and (C) you say the theory can be defined but the
general notion can't be defined for no apparent reason. I'd be
surprised if anyone can make sense of that.
Tuukka:
If we're speaking of a dictionary definition of static quality, sure.
If we're speaking of a logical definition, nope. Pirsig asserts the
MOQ to be logically consistent so I guess it's fair of me to seek for
a logical definition.
I posted an article about this to a peer-reviewed journal. It didn't
pass peer-review because the referee found the conclusion to be
"obvious". Apparently it isn't that obvious.
The article features the notion of "nonrelativizably used predicate".
A predicate has an intension, such as: "calculator", and an extension,
such as my blue calculator, my teacher's scientific calculator, my
neighbor's green calculator and so on, i.e. all calculators. The
extension is what the predicate refers to and the intension is how it
refers to that.
Suppose predicate "a number whose successor is 0". In the theory of
integers the extension of this predicate includes the number -1. In
the theory of natural numbers the extension is empty.
We are using nonrelativizably the predicate "a number whose successor
is 0" if we use it so that it's unclear whether we have relativized it
to the theory of integers or to the theory of natural numbers.
You seem to suppose that the theory of static value patterns turns
"static quality" into a relativizably used predicate. I see the point.
Perhaps it was too harsh of me to state that static quality is
"impossible" to define. However, the act of defining static quality
confines us to a particular perspective. This perspective could be
changed by Dynamic Quality. Therefore, even though we can define
"static quality" at a particular moment the definition will not
include the things we would consider static after the definition has
changed. And a central point of the MOQ is that the Dynamic changes
the static.
However, I don't think a nonrelativizably used predicate qualifies as
an intellectual pattern. It doesn't seem to belong to any of Pirsig's
static levels. Any opinions on this? I know Pirsig says anything
static belongs to one of his levels, but what is intellectual about a
nonrelativizably used predicate?
Furthermore, Pirsig intends the MOQ as logically consistent. While
this is impossible to achieve for undefinable concepts it's possible
to achieve for the theory of static levels. But if the intellectual
level can include nonrelativizably used predicates then the
intellectual level isn't a well-formed set. This can't be Pirsig's
intention because in that case even the theory of static levels
couldn't be determined as logically consistent.
"[50] RMP: This seems too restrictive. [To say SOM is identical to
the intellectual level of the MOQ] It seems to exclude
non-subject-object constructions such as symbolic logic, higher
mathematics, and computer languages from the intellectual level and
gives them no home. Also the term 'quality' as used in the MOQ
would be excluded from the intellectual level. In fact, the MOQ,
which gives intellectual meaning to the term quality, would also
have to be excluded from the intellectual level."
Tukka said: Important point for my case. I've been accused of
trying to impose SOM
on the MOQ. But this annotation states that symbolic logic isn't SOM.
Very convenient. We shouldn't need to argue about this anymore.
dmb says:
Pirsig is explaining why it's "too restrictive" to say that SOM is
identical to the intellectual level, right? And so he's pointing
out some intellectual things that are not SOM. This has no
bearing on whether or not you've understood the relation between
SOM and the MOQ. I have already offered some criticism of
exactly that - But that was done without making any references
to symbolic logic or regular logic.
Tuukka:
You stated that subjects and objects aren't real and that: "In the MOQ
subjects and objects are concepts rather than actually existing
substances or ontological structures." But concepts are intellectual
patterns and intellectual patterns are real. What did you intend me to
make of this contradiction?
Tukka said: The MOQ doesn't contradict logic. Some people seem to
imply it does,
though. I feel this way. Am I wrong?
dmb says:
I don't know who implied such a thing but logical contradictions are
invalid in the MOQ, just as they are in any other philosophy.
Tuukka:
Not in dialetheistic philosophy, like Ron just pointed out.
dmb:
From the SODV (Subjects, Objects, Data and Values) paper:
"In the Metaphysics of Quality the world is composed of three things:
mind, matter and Quality. Because something is not located in the object
does not mean that it has to be located in your mind. Quality cannot be
independently derived from either mind or matter. But it can be derived
from the relationship of mind and matter with each other. Quality occurs
at the point at which subject and object meet. Quality is not a thing.
It is an event. It is the event at which the subject becomes aware of
the object. And because without objects there can be no subject, quality
is the event at which awareness of both subjects and objects is made
possible. Quality is not just the result of a collision between subject
and object. The very existence of subject and object themselves is
deduced from the Quality event. The Quality event is the cause of
the subjects and objects, which are then mistakenly presumed to be the
cause of the Quality!
And:
[65] RMP: ...In the Copenhagen Interpretation, and in all
subject-object metaphysics, both the observed (the object) and the
observer (the subject) are assumed to exist prior to the observation. In
the MOQ, nothing exists prior to the observation. The observation
creates the intellectual patterns called 'observed' and 'observer.'
Think about it. How could a subject and object exist in a world where
there are no observations?''
Tukka said:
Deduced? Hardly. The argument seems inductive rather than deductive. If
it is deductive it is still apparently not deduced but instead declared
as an axiom. If it is indeed deduced, from which axioms? What kind of a
deduction has an undefined concept as a premise?
dmb says:
Yes, deduced. This is what I've been trying to tell you about the
relations between SOM and the MOQ, about the place of subjects and
objects in the MOQ. The real deal with subjects and objects, I
answered in response to your question, is that they are not
really real. They're just ideas derived from experience. And
that's what Pirsig is saying here. In all subject-object
metaphysics, he says, both the object and the subject are
assumed to exist prior to the observation but in the MOQ, the
intellectual patterns called 'observed' and 'observer' are
derived from experience. This is not idealism, by the way,
because it puts experience first, not mind or subjectivity.
This point is also made at the end of chapter 29 of Lila and
there you'll see that he and William James call this radical
empiricism, not idealism.
Tuukka:
I know this is intended as some kind of a variant of the Two Truths
Doctrine. But it isn't well-made. This isn't logical deduction,
because according to Pirsig one can't put Quality into a formula.
Pirsig could've meant some informal notion of deduction, such a the
one Sherlock Holmes talks about when he makes arguments that are
really inductive. But that's an unwise thing to do when presenting a
theory he claims to be logically consistent.
Tukka said: ...but complementarity doesn't allow multiple
contradictory views to
coexist in the same consistent logical system in the same context. And
the only context Pirsig provides for materialism is "good ideas" and the
only context provided for idealism is "true ideas".
dmb says:
The MOQ is the context,
which means Pragmatic truth, which means that truth is plural -
among other things. In Pragmatism truth is not what corresponds to
the one and only objective reality but it has to agree with the
experience when it's put into practice for a particular
purpose. Idealism doesn't make much sense when you're doing
empirical science but materialism will work even if it's not
true in any ultimate sense or in any metaphysical sense. Physics
isn't necessarily any truer than philosophy or poetry and each
domain is allowed to have its own standards of excellence.
Tuukka:
When does idealism make sense, except when attempting to understand the MOQ?
Pirsig states the intellectual level is the mind. But both the
intellectual and the social level are subjective. What is the
difference between the mind and subjectivity?
And just one more. I'm out of time and steam.
[73] RMP: In the MOQ, the
static self is composed of both body and mind and thus is both object
and subject. It is better to define subject as social and intellectual
patterns and object as biological and inorganic patterns. This seems to
help prevent confusion later on."
Tukka said: It doesn't "seem" to prevent confusion now.
dmb says:
I think you've hereby admitted that you're confused about the
relation between SOM and the MOQ, about how to map subjects and
objects onto the four levels of value. If I try to help with that
confusion, you might want to consider thanking me instead of
scolding me. It hardly seems fair to pose the question and then
attack those who presume to answer, you know?
Tuukka:
I'm not confused about the relation between SOM and the MOQ. I'm also
not confused about how to map subjects and objects onto the four
levels of value. I'm confused about how Pirsig maps subjects and
objects onto the four levels of value.
Thank you,
Tuk
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