Tuk, On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 6:03 PM, Tuukka Virtaperko <[email protected]> wrote: > Dan, > > > > >> >>> >>>>>>>> "Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known >>>>>>>> object.' >>>>>>>> [111] RMP: Object: n. >>>>>>>> Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by >>>>>>>> vision >>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>> touch; a material thing. >>>>>>>> 1. A focus of attention, feeling, thought or action. >>>>>>>> 2. The purpose, aim, goal of a specific action or effort. >>>>>>>> 3. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or >>>>>>>> substantive >>>>>>>> following and governed by a preposition. >>>>>>>> 4. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind. >>>>>>>> (American Heritage Dictionary) >>>>>>>> The 'objects' in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are >>>>>>>> biological >>>>>>>> patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns. >>>>>>>> The >>>>>>>> 'objects' Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5. It seems to >>>>>>>> me >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects. Thus any distinction >>>>>>>> between >>>>>>>> them is meaningless." >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If ideas can't be objects does that mean they can't even be the >>>>>>>> focus >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> attention, feeling, thought or action? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Why is there no Definition #5? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dan: >>>>>> My apologies. This error was corrected in later versions of LC: >>>>>> >>>>>> Object: n. >>>>>> >>>>>> 1. Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by >>>>>> vision or touch; a material thing. >>>>>> >>>>>> 2. A focus of attention, feeling, thought, or action. >>>>>> >>>>>> 3. The purpose, aim, or goal of a specific action or effort. >>>>>> >>>>>> 4. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is >>>>>> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or >>>>>> substantive following and governed by a preposition. >>>>>> >>>>>> 5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind. >>>>>> >>>>>> (American Heritage Dictionary) >>>>>> >>>>>> The ?objects? in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are >>>>>> biological patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social >>>>>> patterns. The ?objects? Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5. >>>>>> It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects. >>>>>> Thus any distinction between them is meaningless. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Tuukka: >>>>> >>>>> Okay, good to have that sorted out. Anyway: >>>>> >>>>> * LC RMP annotation 3: "Life is matter that has been configured by DNA. >>>>> The >>>>> distinction is very sharp." >>>>> * LC RMP annotation 4: "In the MOQ all organisms are objective. They >>>>> exist >>>>> in the material world. All societies are subjective. They exist in the >>>>> mental world. Again, the distinction is very sharp. For example, the >>>>> 'President of the U.S.' is a social pattern. No objective scientific >>>>> instrument can distinguish a President of the U.S. from anyone else." >>>>> >>>>> Funny that the distinction between objects and subjects should be "very >>>>> sharp" when it comes to the difference between biological and social >>>>> things, >>>>> but meaningless when it comes to the difference between ideas and >>>>> physical >>>>> objects. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dan: >>>> It isn't meaningless. Where do you get that from? >>>> >>> >>> Tuukka: >>> You wrote: "It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be >>> objects. Thus any distinction between them is meaningless." >> >> Dan: >> For the record, I didn't write that. Robert Pirsig wrote it in >> response to Donny's post: >> >> "Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known >> object.' >> >> 5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind. >> >> What Robert Pirsig is pointing to is Donny's definition and how it >> makes any distinction between them (known subject, known object) >> meaningless. Key word: known. So I think you've misinterpreted what is >> being said. > > > > Tuukka: > > Okay, so Pirsig says that in definition 5 the distinction is meaningless but > he uses another definition. In any case Pirsig argues: > > In definition 5 subjects can be objects. Therefore the distinction between > subjects and objects is meaningless in definition 5. > > How come? Even if subjects can be objects, can objects be subjects? If they > can, a rock can be a subject. What would that kind of a subject be, apart > from being at least superficially silly?
Dan: You seem to be taking subjects and objects as primary. > > >> >>> Sometimes deduction is Dynamic. >> >> Dan: >> Oh no. Dynamic Quality comes first. Deduction may appear as a flash of >> insight but without intellect, how can there be deduction? > > > > Tuukka: > Oh come on, dmb does rhetoric all the time but I'm not allowed to? Dan: Where did rhetoric enter the discussion? What I said was if there is no intellect there can be no deduction. Dynamic Quality comes first. > > >> >>> Sometimes a correct and relevant >>> deduction just pops into my mind out of nowhere. Is that static? >> >> Dan: >> Yes. >> >>> No, >>> otherwise it would've already been there. Is that experience? >> >> Dan: >> The deduction comes after experience. > > > > Tuukka: > The experience is identified as deduction afterwards. Dan: Yes. > > >> >>> Yes... I >>> don't quite understand what would someone mean by stating that it's >>> not experience. But it's perhaps not empirical experience. >> >> Dan: >> If you want to qualify it like that, yes. Deduction is always a memory. > > > > Tuukka: > Well, one needs to remember the premises. > > >> >> >>>> Dan: >>>> Look at it this way: we 'believe' in neither idealism or materialism. >>>> Instead, the MOQ encompasses both in a more expansive framework >>> >>> >>> >>> Tuukka: >>> >>> But does that framework make sense? Idealism is just a nominal feature >>> of Pirsig's MOQ. Suppose Pirsig's MOQ were a car with those furry dice >>> hanging from the front window. The furry dice would be idealism. Then >>> you tried to sell that car to a guy who hates furry dice. He could >>> just take the furry dice off and the customer wouldn't consider it an >>> essentially different car. That's the problem. Idealism is just stuck >>> on to Pirsig's MOQ. It doesn't function, it's just an inert add-on. >>> >>> The theory of static value patterns isn't idealistic. What makes the >>> MOQ norminally idealistic are Pirsig's some strikingly casual and >>> short remarks in the LS annotations. >> >> Dan: >> It appears (to me) that you've either misread or misinterpreted Lila. > > > > Tuukka: > It appears to me that you're a busy man. Dan: I am. And it appears I am wasting my time here. > > >> >>> >>> >>> Tuukka: >>> Pirsig states in LILA that the MOQ is logically consistent. This means >>> Pirsig's MOQ disallows dialetheia. I know, you'd expect Pirsig's MOQ to >>> allow >>> them. I'd expect that too. But according to Pirsig it doesn't. >> >> Dan: >> You are (apparently) fixating upon one form of logic to the exclusion >> of all else. > > > > Tuukka: > Did you mean: "Pirsig is fixating... "? Dan: No. > > > >> >>>>> Tuukka: >>>>> LILA actually contains an elaborate variant of emergent materialism: >>>>> Pirsig's theory of static value patterns. When one compares that to >>>>> what >>>>> Pirsig writes of idealism it's like comparing a mountain to a grain of >>>>> sand. >>>> >>>> >>>> Dan: >>>> I disagree. What Pirsig is hammering at is how the prevalent point of >>>> view today is materialism. That is why he suggested how philosophic >>>> idealism might help in forming a better understanding with the MOQ. >>>> That is why it may seem as if Lila is concerned to a greater extent >>>> with one than the other. But the static patterns as described in Lila >>>> cover both idealism and materialism. The reader fixates more on >>>> materialism due to our Western culture's biases. >>> >>> >>> >>> Tuukka: >>> The static patterns in LILA don't contain idealism. They contain >>> materialism. Idealism is something Pirsig just sticks on the MOQ in >>> LC, you know, like gluing a sore thumb on the hood of your car. >> >> Dan: >> From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/ >> It nevertheless seems safe to say that within modern philosophy there >> have been two fundamental conceptions of idealism: >> >> 1. something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate >> foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality, and >> >> 2 although the existence of something independent of the mind is >> conceded, everything that we can know about this mind-independent >> “reality” is held to be so permeated by the creative, formative, or >> constructive activities of the mind (of some kind or other) that all >> claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of >> self-knowledge. >> >> There are numerous examples of idealism in Lila. Here are a few: >> >> The Dharmakaya light. > > > > Tuukka: > Hallucinations do not prove idealism, so why would Dharmakaya light? > > >> >> "It is this subjective side of values that led to their being long >> tabooed as improper for consideration by natural science," Kroeber and >> Kluckhohn said. > > > > Tuukka: > How does this pertain to idealism? Dan: I provided the Stanford definition for a reason. Or did you not realize that? > > >> >> By virtue of their subjective emotion and ethical character, norms and >> especially values are among the world's most difficult objects to >> identify with certainty. > > > > Tuukka: > How does this pertain to idealism? > > >> >> In a subject-object metaphysics morals and art are worlds apart, >> morals being concerned with the subject quality and art with object >> quality. But in the Metaphysics of Quality that division doesn't >> exist. They're the same. They both become much more intelligible when >> references to what is subjective and what is objective are completely >> thrown away and references to what is static and what is Dynamic are >> taken up instead. > > > > Tuukka: > None of these citations have so far even mentioned idealism. Dan: Okay. Have it your way. I am pretty much done here. -- http://www.danglover.com Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
