Hi Platt and Others
On 28 Jan 99, at 10:50, Platt Holden wrote:
> Horse, your explanation of holistic vs. relative view reminds of the
> following passage from Richard Dawkins' latest book, "Unweaving the
> Rainbow:�
<SNIP>
> ...Desmond's fate, and yours and mine, too. Not just Napoleon but the
> humblest medieval peasant had only to sneeze in order to affect
> something which changed something else which, after a long chain
> reaction, led to the consequence that one of your would-be ancestors
> failed to be your ancestor and became somebody else's instead. I'm not
> talking about chaos theory or the equally trendy complexity theory, but
> just about ordinary statistics of causation. The thread of historical events
> by which our existence hangs is wincingly tenuous."
>
> Well, there's one version of the "holistic� view, which is why I asked,
> �Where do you draw the line?�.
I would have said that the above would be more likely to be considered a chain of
events
than a true holistic view as it fails to take account of the numerous other events and
circumstances which would accompany its passage through history. But I'm glad you
brought
up Dawkins as, there are a number of instances where Dawkins provides enthusiastic
support for a holistic approach, which is unsurprising given his association with the
Santa Fe Institute for Complex Studies and his own knowledge and participation into
research with Artificial Life systems. Incidentally, I would also not feel
unreasonable
in accusing Dawkins of utilizing various views and dropping them like a hot potato
when
they fail to support his own position. An excellent example of this can be found in
what
is probably his best book (IMO) "The Extended Phenotype". Additionally, Complexity
Theory
and Chaos may be considered by some to be "trendy", which is their prerogative, but
any
statement, such as that provided above, fails to provide adequate reasoning as to a
lack
of validity which may be implied by such a statement. It certainly doesn't persuade me
to
doubt the validity of Chaos, Complexity or holism in general.
I haven't yet read "Unweaving the Rainbow", but as I've read all of Dawkins' other
books,
a great number of his articles and papers and subscribe to a Dawkins mailing list,
I'll
no doubt read it as soon as it comes out in paperback.
> HORSE answered:
> > "... you have to remain within the limits of what can reasonably be related
> > to whatever activity you are involved in.�
> and
> > "The best that can be done � is assess the degree to which events
> > affect each other."
>
> > So if I interpret your answer correctly, we end up back in relativism again
> > where we can argue interminably about whose "reasonable assessment"
> > of the events affecting the activity in question is the most reasonable
> > before we can even get to the question of to what degree the activity was
> > good or evil.
I would say that it is very easy to avoid relativism once the foundations of
Complexity
(and Chaos for that matter) are understood well enough (no insult intended Platt, I'm
not
pretending to be an _expert_ in either of these fields, but relatively well versed).
The
'fan-out' factor in Complexity soon prevents any meaningful results purely by
unassisted
human assessment and so becomes self-limiting. If you have ever played or seen
Conway's
game of 'Life' then you'll know what I mean. This is the main reason why I am
doubtful
of the overall validity of human assessments of Good and Evil or whether they actually
have any true meaning except in a very limited sense and why I think that Pirsig
offers
us some salvation. It is also one of the reasons that I am so set against the idea of
absolutes and prefer to use the concept of extremes where they appear valid.
> Compare your holistic view to Pirsig�s when he says in Chapter 13 in
> �LILA:�
>
> �In general, given a choice of two courses to follow and all other things
> being equal, that choice which is more Dynamic, that is, at a higher level
> of evolution, is more moral. An example of this is the statement that, 'It's
> more moral for a doctor to kill a germ than to allow the germ to kill his
> patient.' The germ wants to live. The patient wants to live. But the patience
> has moral precedence because he's at a higher level of evolution.
> "Taken by itself that seems obvious enough. But what�s not so obvious is
> that, given a value-centered Metaphysics of Quality, it is absolutely,
> scientifically moral for a doctor to prefer the patient. This is not just an
> arbitrary social convention that should apply to some doctors but not to all
> doctors, or to some cultures but not all cultures. It�s true for all people at
> all time, now and forever, a moral pattern as real as H20. We're at last
> dealing with morals on the basis of reason. We can now deduce codes
> based on evolution that analyze moral arguments with greater precision
> than before."
>
> The most relevant part of this quotation to our discussion is Pirsig's use
> of the absolutist sentence: �It's true for all people, at all time, now and
> forever.�
Platt, please note Pirsigs use of "all other things being equal". This phrase is
notorious in that it is a device intended to simplify a complex problem and is, I
believe, being used by Pirsig in this way. In the highly simplified circumstances that
there are two and only two possible choices that may be made then an absolutist
position
may be proposed because conditions have been manipulated to reduce the choices
available
to an either/or position. Given a more realistic set of circumstances, which is not
hard
to imagine, the question as to whether the only correct moral choice is to kill the
germ(s) becomes more complex.
> So yes, I agree with you that Pirsig's morality is "holistic" in the sense
> that it covers all the bases from atoms to concepts. But his morality also
> draws definite lines whereby one can determine good from evil, right
> from wrong on a rational, "scientific" basis.
Reading through the rest of chapter thirteen of Lila I can seea number of examples
whereby Pirsig recognizes the the more complex nature of moral choice. I agree that
the
MOQ provides for a strong (if not the strongest) basis for determining the most moral
choice, but, as with any other form of moral system it does not and cannot deal in
absolutes. This is not necessarily a weakness in the MOQ but a problem inherent in the
nature of any worthwhile moral system.
> Later in the same chapter, Pirsig makes a rather broad claim:
>
> "It was tempting to take all the moral conflicts of the world and, one by
> one, see how they fit this kind of analysis, but Phaedrus realized that if
> he started to get into that he would never finish. Wherever he looked,
> whatever examples came to mind, he always seemed to be able to lay
> them out within this framework, and the nature of the conflicts seemed to
> be clearer when he did so."
>
> What appeals to me is that Pirsig narrows his holistic view to a
> evolutionary morality "framework," enabling those who agree with the
> framework to decide moral issues more reasonably and with greater
> possibility for agreement than otherwise.
The above is a much more realistic view of the process of moral choice than in the
preceeding parts of your post and in this I think we have much in common. As with
yourself, I think that the framework that Pirsig provides is vastly superior to any
other
moral system of which I am aware and, as you say," moral issues can be decided more
reasonably and with and with greater possibility for agreement than otherwise". This
is
however a long way from a moral absolutist position.
> Should you wish to continue the discussion, my next question to you
> would be, �Do you agree that Pirsig�s framework is useful in analyzing
> moral questions? If not, is there any framework other than open-ended
> holism (context) that you find of value?
Well, as you can see I have continued the discussion and I think you will see that I
consider Pirsig's framework useful in analyzing moral questions. I also think that one
of
the great strengths of the MOQ is that it provides for a holistic approach to moral
reasoning.
PIRSIG:
"What the evolutionary structure of the Metaphysics of Quality shows is that there is
not
just one moral system. There are many....
.... What is today conventionally called 'morality' covers only one of these sets of
moral codes, the social-biological code. In a subject-object metaphysics this single
social-biological code is considered to be a minor, 'subjective', physically
non-existent
part of the universe. But in the Metaphysics of Quality all these sets of morals, plus
another Dynamic morality are not only real, THEY ARE THE WHOLE THING (my capitals)"
R.M. Pirsig, Chapter 13, Lila
If it was not Pirsigs intention to create an overwhelmingly holistic framework within
which moral choices can be made then please tell me why he chose to include everything
from a quark to a thought and then threw in Dynamic Quality as the basis for his moral
system.
As a final thought, and I am aware of your own thoughts on this subject Platt, I am
interested in examining Struan's coherent materialism in relation to moral systems and
the MOQ. From what I have read of his and other similar ideas I think that there is a
valid materialistic starting point, strongly oppositional to the Pirsigian SOM
position,
which could also bring the MOQ into a more favourable academic light, without the need
to
compromise a single one of Pirsigs ideas.
Horse
"Making history, it turned out, was quite easy.
It was what got written down.
It was as simple as that!"
Sir Sam Vimes.
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