Pirsig talked about natural laws and how they are invented, not discovered,
by people. As he said (Zen, pp. 40-42, Quill trade paperback edition), there
was no law of gravity sitting out in nothingness before the universe was
"born," waiting to be discovered. People observed certain behavior,
generalized from their observations, and codified the generalizations, or
theories, according to their usefulness.
Reality, I tend to think, just is. How we describe it is largely semantic,
but there are pragmatic advantages in certain analyses. For instance, it is
useful to postulate that there are universal laws of nature, and that we may
discover them. But the process of formulating such a proposition and then
producing a valid extension of that proposition consititutes a
self-fulfilling prophecy; it doesn't prove the universality or truth of the
original postulates.
Es claro? We invent explanations, what seems to work we keep, what doesn't
we scrap. If an explanation works, does that mean people "discovered" it?
No more than people discovered the telephone, I'd say. The most I would say
is that a phenomenon exists, and here's how we describe it because it's the
best description so far: "law of gravity."
For this reason, I was confused about "discovered" and "created" laws. Seems
to me people invent laws, they don't discover them; unless you posit absolute
truths, in which case we're back to dogma again, not DQ.
If I may: Pirsig referred to evolution metaphorically as climbing a ladder
(Lila). If you hold on too tightly to one rung, you can't rise to the next;
if you hold on too loosely, you risk falling to a lower rung. To extend the
metaphor, I think laws are static forms of quality, intended to keep us from
regressing to an earlier stage of evolution (cf. "static latching", Lila). As
such, they are necessary for society to function without dissolving into
anarchy; but if laws are too inflexible, society runs the risk of stagnating
or even exploding into revolt.
I think the reason Pirsig's words (as quoted by John B.) have a "fascist
feel" to them is because in Pirsig's metaphysical hierarchy, society is a
higher form of evolution than individuals. Individuals feed the societal
organism; they're fodder for the horse. (Er... hehe Horse! <G>) Pirsig also
stated that intellect is a higher form than society. Following the metaphor
of the horse, intellect is the Frenchman who breeds horses for meat. (Ugh.
It's all I could come up with on short notice. Sorry Horse!)
I like what John B. said about three different kinds of DQ. I'm guessing the
three kinds may be defined according to which evolutionary levels they
straddle?
Pirsig referred to the problem of differentiating between individuals who
advance this evolutionary climb ('high DQ quotient'?), and those who prolong
or block it ("saviors" and "degenerates", Lila pp.223-224, hardcover). In
essence, I think it can't be done. We can do a lot with laws, to try to
guarantee respect for individual freedoms while at the same time serving the
needs of society (and intellect, let's hope); but will we ever truly
guarantee peaceful coexistence of the separate evolutionary levels in every
situation?
Probably not; but it's useful to postulate that we can, so that people will
continue to try.
-Scott
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