Hi all ! This is a bit of personal mail between Bodvar and myself that he thought might deserve publication. Well, I'll let you judge this. The argument was : are emotions part of the social level (Bodvar's PoV) or the biological (my PoV) ? Denis Poisson wrote: > > Hi, Bodvar, > > B. Skutvik wrote: > > > > Denis! > > We do not agree fully, but explaining one's own view often helps > > clarifying it to oneself. I have long struggled with this aspect of > > the quality idea and alternate between finding it an unnecessary > > complication and a great improvement ... that is, the basic idea > > needs no improvement merely a refinement, something that will make it > > less vulnerable. If you follow the discussion you'll see how many > > traps and "paradoxes" people are capable of discovering. > > Yeah, sometime I feel a bit discouraged by how many inconsistencies I am > able to find in my own understanding of the MoQ, and how many paradoxes > I'm unable to clarify, but remembering that a perfect metaphysics > doesn't exists helps me (well, a little) to go on. > > > I wrote (quoting Pirsig) : > > > "In the Metaphysics of Quality 'causation' is a metaphysical term that > > > can be replaced by 'value'. To say that 'A causes B' or to say that 'B > > > values precondition A' is to say the same thing. The difference is one > > > of words only." > > > > > If we follow this argument to its logical conclusion, it basically > > > states that apart from believing the scientific truth to be absolute (a > > > belief that few scientists have, anyway) nothing really has to change in > > > our understanding of the inorganic-biological levels, or in the methods > > > used to discover them. In fact, Pirsig even says that SOM thinking was > > > actually right in its desire to free the intellectual level from the > > > interference of the biological and social levels in its search for the > > > laws of nature. Under the MoQ, I think we should adopt a concept similar > > > to objectivity, that we might call "non-interference of the levels". > > You answered : > > > > Exactly. Allow me an aside here. I have - besides the present > > - forwarded the idea that Subject/Object metaphysics may be > > regarded as the intellectual level of the MOQ itself. For, what is > > REASON other than the value of distinguishing between objectivity and > > subjectivity? That way SOM is no longer an alien metaphysics but an > > integrated part of the MOQ. (if the acronym SOLAQI should pop up it > > means: subject-object-logic-as-Q-intellect). > > > > This idea has in fact many interesting points, but I wonder if you do > not push it a tad too far. That we are able to think of ourselves as > separates entities seems a good starting point for the rise of reason > (but I still think of this term in a vague sense of social/intellectual > levels thrown together - SOM mind if you will), but to define REASON > (your definition of it - ie. the Intellectual level) as Subject-Object > Logic seems, well, a bit too occidental to me. > Since S/O logic is a discovery that can be historically and > geographically located in Greece, 500 years BC, it would mean that > basically, other civilizations never had an Intellectual level at all > prior to this, and that until the 19th century it was the sole > possession of western (and muslim) civilization ! That would also mean > that by becoming a colonial power, the countries of Europe allowed the > rest of the world to access the next evolutionary level (how nice of us > !!!). > > I find that a bit hard to swallow. In my opinion, the existence of an > oriental philosophy (buddhism, taoism) implies an intellectual level at > work, and that, with your interpretation, would mean that there are two > kinds of intellectual levels, that didn't grow from the same root. I > think we should delve further than that to find the *real* root of the > Intellectual level (the machine code, if you will). > > Our contribution to the world is more humble, I think. What we gave to > the world at large is the notion that the Intellectual level should be > superior to the Social (a notion many civilizations still have > difficulties to swallow). That's all, and that's already a lot. > > Nevertheless, what I find good in your idea is that the S/O division is > in some way the reason for the rise of the intellectual level. I'm not > an anthropologist, but I suspect that every civilization express this > concept in one form or another. > > > Back to the issue at hand. > > > > > Thus, if we want the MoQ to have any utility (and recognition) we have > > > to define what we believe to be the basic blocks of the upper two levels > > > , to discover the "machine code" between b/s and s/i levels, and then to > > > develop theories and models for them. These probably won't be > > > deterministic in the way i/b levels are (if we forget sub-atomic > > > physics), but that shouldn't stop us. Once we understand these levels > > > better, the chances of wrongful interference will lessen as a result. > > > > Agreed. I too would have liked to delve into this field, but it looks > > like we are out-voted. > > > > True, but it was a close shave. I think we'll have better luck next > month. > > > > So to come back to your Interaction - Sensation - Emotion - Reason > > > sequence, I think we can rightly talk about Interaction at the Inorganic > > > level. It looks like a useful concept to me, and as long as we remember > > > that we are only building a model, a static intellectual pattern, there > > > is no need to branch off into epistemological battles. > > > But, after that our opinions differ. > > > > > You seem to think that emotions grow out of sensations, while I see no > > > reason to believe this at all (when I feel sad, or fearful, bodily > > > sensations grow out of this emotion, not the reverse). If this isn't > > > your point (your sequence isn't an evolutionary sequence) then I still > > > fail to see why you would think this sequence would parallel the > > > evolutionary scale of Pirsig. > > > > Does a bodily sensation grow out of emotions? All creatures sense, > > even the simplest, but do they "emote" (is that a word? The problem > > with English is the ambiguity of the term "feel". No better in > > Norwegian for that matter, how is it in French?). In my view the pain > > from being beaten is something more fundamental that the "pain" from > > watching another person being beaten. The first is > > biological/sensational the last social/emotional. > > Well, we have two french terms, but unfortunately, they overlap. > "Sentir" is used for physical sensations (the five senses, pain, > pleasure, etc.), "ressentir" for emotions, but also for the former. The > interesting thing (which might bring water to your watermill, as we say) > is that "ressentir" means (etymologically) to *re-feel* (to feel twice) > which might mean that emotions are more abstracted than sensations, but > I feel this is a heritage from SOM thinking. We put a distance between > ourselves and our emotions, because they do not originate from an "real" > (material) source. That might be the reason for your argument. > > BTW, I think no sensation or emotion is totally free from the > interference of mind. When I was a teenager (12 or 13) I once touched a > hot radiator in school, and instinctively withdrew my hand from it. I > grew interested to see if I could divorce the sensation (dynamic > perception) from the notion of pain (static interpretation), put my hand > back on the radiator, and left it there, concentrating on the sensation > *only*. After a while, the notion that I was feeling pain disappeared, > leaving only the hot/cold tingling sensation in my hand, which wasn't > either agreable or disagreable, it just *was*. > Finally noticing that people were looking at me strangely, I withdrew my > hand again, and after a while, losing my concentration, the pain > resurfaced. The sensation didn't change, I just grew aware that it was > pain I was feeling, that's all. In fact, after that I didn't give it > much importance, and it soon faded. > The false lesson in this is that our mind can divorce us from the real > world, but in fact I think this experience only divorced me from the > static interpretation of the sensation, leaving the dynamic sensation > bare. When we burn ourselves, we get a sensation that we are > (biologically) wired to recoil from, and then we interpret it as pain > (an intellectual construct, after all), but the sensation in and of > itself isn't pain, it's just a sensation. Mystics often talk about the > notion of good and evil disapearing when enlightenment sets in, leaving > only pure awareness (Quality). > > I think this is true at every level, we always filter and deform what we > feel, giving it good or bad interpretation, that aren't really there. So > feeling some pain as less real than others is probably IMHO just an > interpretation of what you're really feeling. > > When my last affair (to which I accorded great importance) ended, I felt > great pain (and had a lot of physical reactions : difficulty to breathe, > acceleration of the pulse, watering of the eyes, hypernervous condition, > etc.), more perhaps that it deserved, and definitely more than any > recent physical pain I've felt (the last one of this latter type was > when my mother accidentally put a hot frying pan in my hand, so that > must tell you something). > > My point is, I put great importance (value) in a romantic relation, and > it hurt me badly (don't cry, I've recovered ;) ), but very little in my > burned hand, and the pain didn't last more than a few minutes (but my > hand still was a bit oversensitive for two days). So, the two sensations > having similar biological effects, I think they have basically the same > origin. The difference we feel is only one of how much value we put in > it. On a more grisly note, torturers often know that heightening the > expectation of pain often makes it more unbearable to their victims : > they are so sure that the pain will be unbearable that it *becomes* so. > Amerindians, perhaps more in touch with the immediateness of experience, > had a reputation for being able to endure great pain without faltering. > > > > > Of course emotions have a modifying effect upon sensations, > > it's a part of the MOQ doctrine that the upper level interferes with > > the lower. > > > > My example also illustrates this point, but in a different light. It was > not my emotions that altered my feelings, but the static value I put in > them both that altered my dynamic perception of them. If I had let go of > the static value of my ill-fated romance, my pain would have been > lessened (as it happened later). > > > > After all, why shouldn't we put both sensation and emotion under > > > the biological label? > > > > For the reason that a huge part of the biological realm obviously > > don't have the capability to show emotions except primates that live > > in"societies". The more complex the social interaction the more > > pronounced the emotions. It is of course very crude with many > > species. Yet, when dogs snarls or cats raise the bristles it is a > > signal that their opponent interpret as potential pain. In other > > words: emotion is abstracted* sensation > > > > * [The term 'abstract' is of course SOM infested (as opposite to > > what is concrete) but in the above context the next level is not less > > real than the lower.] > > > > I think it's more than SOM infested... it's owned by it. ;^) > But to counter your example, cats are far less social creatures than > dogs are, but they don't seem to exhibit less emotional range than dogs > do. > > > > advanced emotion = reason. Hmm... I'd like you to develop this branch of > > > your reasoning a bit further, because I have a hunch that until we find > > > out more about the top-two levels, most research into this field will be > > > a bit like groping in the dark. > > > > As above: abstracted emotion = REASON! The Q idea is that all > > value levels evolved away from their original purpose and became > > a value of its own. The abstraction idea shows how sensation became > > so "advanced" that it took leave of its biological roots and became > > social value (the members of a wolf pack demonstrate by BODY signals > > what the SOCIAL position is) and likewise; SOCIAL signals > > became more and more subtle, until they could be regarded as REASON > > > > Another interpretation might go like this : inside a level, they are > scales of evolution, as Pirsig justification of vegetarianism shows, and > while there is good reason to believe emotions are more evolved than > sensations (only higher mammals seem to possess them, but don't forget > the green flash), nothing in the MoQ forces them to be in another level. > So, the social level might have used these advanced sensations to build > itself, like the biological level used the carbon atom properties to > build itself, but I don't see you arguing than carbon is in the > biological level. :) > Also, just as life could have chosen another element (and it did : I > read that some life forms far under the sea aren't based on > carbon-hydrogen combinations. I think it was worms that live near > undersea volcanos), social evolution has sometimes grown from instinct > rather than emotions (like ants). > > > > For me, a dog defending its cubs regardless of pain is protecting a > > > social pattern and overriding biological sensation okay. But is it an > > > emotion that makes him do that, or an atavistic instinct ? > > > > "Instinct" is SOM's catch-all phrase. What makes a dog defend its > > cubs is certainly a social instinct (or pattern - the same that makes > > us defend our children). However, at the human scale the social > > "instincts" have grown to include a lot of causes (family, tribe, > > country) and become so complex that we call it love, patriotism > > etc. > > > > That isn't true, social instinct is nearly an oxymoron when applied to > humans. Social codes are learned, not inherent in us. We have very > low-level social instincts : a slight desire to protect our children, > which seems nearly absent in men, the need for others (gregarious > instinct), some hierarchical instinct, that's about all that can be > defined as "social". The example below shows that "instinct" is very > real and not a "SOM's catch-all phrase". While it has been used > inapproprietly sometimes, it is mainly because we do not understand (and > until this century, never had much interest in) the social level as an > intellectual field of research. > > I think the main social root is the imitative instinct, displayed in > young cubs or children games, that unables them to grasp the social > intricacies of their societies. Humans also use education and language, > but it is a evolution (inside the social level) upon the basic responses > of most primates. > As such, the human social level is mostly acquired, and reinforced with > social notions of guilt, punishment and law. Other mammals, like dogs, > have less of a choice when it comes to defending their youngsters, while > we can (and unfortunately often do) run instead of endangering our lives > for our children. > > > > A french biologist, Henri Laborit, has found out that the image of a hawk over > > > freshly-hatched chicken produces an immediate response : lie down and > > > play dead. Since this obviously cannot have been learned, it must be a > > > kind of biological program, encoded somewhere in chicken DNA. The > > > frontier between social and biological behaviour seems to vary according > > > to species : some offspring are born with a lot of immediate knowledge, > > > some others, like humans, with very little. This, obviously, is an > > > advantage : the social level is much more dynamic than the biological. A > > > needed change might take a million years if it is to change at the > > > biological level, and only a few generations if at the social. > > > > Highly interesting, but "programmed" is similar to instincts. Human > > babies are obviously both socially and even intellectually > > programmed, and no doubt there are genes for those abilities and yet > > aren't "biological" in a MOQ sense - - - no more than biology is > > inorganic even if life is composed of matter. All value levels build > > upon the lower one. > > > > In fact I must correct my example. I remembered that I read this fact in > "The Masks of God : Primitive Mythology", from J. Campbell, not in > Laborit. In fact, the latter studied the cases of savage children (among > other things, like hierarchical dynamics in social circles) and > consistently proved that the child nervous system doesn't develop fully > when deprived of human contact. Like a muscle that isn't used, it > atrophies. Babies aren't intellectually or socially programmed, they > just have the potential for programmation (a hard disk and a BIOS, if > you want). If no programmation is done, the potential fades. The > potential is biological, not social. The social level is a program that > our biological nervous system *runs*. It is why I believe it is mostly > acquired, and humans *don't* acquire emotions (but I accept that they > are probably even further developped by the social level, because it > *needs* them to reinforce social bonds, love being a good example), in > fact they often have to repress some of them (like greed or anger) for > the social good. > > The social level is ruthless in its use of emotions : it heightens the > ones it needs, and stunts or repress those than endanger it. It is not > composed of them, but of behaviours that have the force of tradition, of > tales that exhalts the behaviours it values and of laws that repress > those it doesn't, of ceremonies that heightens the emotions it wants > (fear, aggressivity, a sense of community or respect for the leader, it > depends on the ceremonies). Emotions are only the dynamic forces behind > such behaviours, not the behaviours themselves. They are at the frontier > of the b/s levels, but still mostly on the biological side. > > > > Hope you're doing good (and looking for answers to the universe riddles, > > > it makes life interesting) :) > > > > I am constantly (regrettably :-)). There will certainly be many > > opportunities for us to exchange views, but this is probable as much > > as you can stand in one serving. > > > > Over to you. > > Bo > > This was a long post, I hope I'm not overstreching your indulgence or > patience, and that I've clarified my position enough. I think it is > consistent, but any flaw you notice will be welcome. > > Sorry for the personal elements in this, I understand the rhetorical > difficulties of attacking something that one might find emotionally > charged, but don't worry, I can be a cold unemotional objective bastard > when the mood strikes me, so don't feel restrained in your answer, I > won't feel offended. Really. ;) > > Signed : > The Cold Fish > > O > o > . > -(:O)- MOQ Online Homepage - http://www.moq.org Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/ Unsubscribe - http://www.moq.org/md/index.html MD Queries - [EMAIL PROTECTED]
