Hi John and group:
John's critique of the MOQ has a number of different �strands� as
he calls them--nine in all. To discuss them all would require an
article almost as long as the original which now resides on the
Forum. So I'll comment on just one strand at a time.
In Strand 1, John challenges Pirsig's assertion, �Quality is the
primary empirical reality of the world� by saying the assertion is not
�testable� and thus too broad. By testable John means data
accessible to the biological senses. If you can't see it, touch it,
taste, smell it or hear it, it�s not �empirical reality� in John�s view.
Limiting or reducing the meaning of "empirical" to what is accessible
to the biological senses cuts out direct awareness of the social,
intellectual and mystic (artistic, spiritual) levels. Yet all of these are
empirical in the sense that they are immediately apprehended by
human awareness to one degree or another.
John would be hard pressed I think to defend the proposition that
honesty, a social level pattern, isn't directly experienced. Tell that to
the judge who fined Clinton for perjury. At the social level, lying is
real enough to get you fired or put in jail.
Nor would John get far in asserting that one does not directly
apprehend mathematical truths such as 2 + 2 = 4. Mathematics
consists of mental structures every bit as "real" as physical
structures to the human mind.
Also, the very fact of John's writing his essay presupposes his (and
our) immediate awareness of words, syntax, logic, concepts,
images, symbols and all the other accoutrements of language that
comprise intellectual patterns, known in the human sciences as
�mental-phenomenology.� There is no way to �test,� using biological
senses alone, the meaning of John's essay.
Curiously, in his description of Strand 2 John admits to having
direct experience at the mystic, artistic level. �In my work as a
sculptor, I can readily distinguish between the artistic quality and the
moral value of my work, despite the fact that both forms of quality
are easier to know than to define.� I don't think John would say that
when he �readily distinguishes� that his experience is something
other than an immediate apprehension of differences.
So I think John gets off on the wrong foot in Strand 1 by restricting
the meaning of "empirical reality" to only what is "testable" using
biological senses available to any stray dog or cat.
If on the other hand �empirical reality� is broadened to include ALL
that humans directly experience--including mystic revelation--then
Pirsig's assertion that �Quality is the primary empirical reality of the
world" is correct. Empirical reality does not have to be "refined"
down to the level of organisms as John suggests. We humans
experience a good deal more than organisms, mechanisms,
systems and forces that comprise the materialist, reductionist
worldview.
Or, to borrow a phrase, �There are more things in heaven and earth
than are dreamt of in a testable philosophy.� I�d guess that John,
being an artist, knows that from direct empirical experience better
than most. (-:
Platt
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