Roger stated:
> Scott, although not quoting you, I believe the above addresses your
> post in entirity. I feel that you are following Struan's lead and
> oversimplifying the free will issue onto the single dimension of
> predictability.
Scott expounds:
Actually, in reviewing the recent articles in this thread, I believe Struan's
'oversimplification' to be rather succinct.
To review:
Struan said: "I will stick with the realisation that free will lies in the
fact that we cannot predict what we are going to do". I understood 'we' in
that passage to refer to humanity in general.
Roger retorted, "Unpredictableness is not sufficient for free will.... the
concept of free will also requires self determinism." I agree that
unpredictability is not sufficient, by the way.
Pirsig (damn it, Lila should have an index) wrote: "To the extent that one's
behavior is controlled by static patterns [of Quality, or X, or whatever], it
is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which
is undefinable, one's behavior is free." (p. 156, 1st ed hardcover)
Scott reiterates in his own way:
To the extent that the pattern of self is influenced and created by patterns
of biology, society and intellect, sure, action of the self is generally
predictable. (Predictability of the vectors and ergs of action - what I
merrily refer to as the 'monads' of action - is limited by well-defined
physical principles, 'discovered' by science.) Further, to the extent that
the self responds to unknown, unmeasured, by definition undefinable stimuli
('Quality' or 'X' as you prefer), action of the self is not predictable. All
well and good.
BUT how much of what is currently unknown will someday be measured, defined
and incorporated into a theory of behavior (or 'action of the self')? We
cannot know. It is reasonable to accept Godel's Theorem, chaos theory,
quantum theory etc. and conclude that there will always be something 'we know
not what' to which one may ascribe free will, since these approach the limits
of our knowledge. But to conclude this to be universally true for all time
is not reasonable to my mind. Does not Pirsig himself imply that truth is a
function of time? (Anyone want to find support for that? God, I want an
electronic, _searchable_ version of Lila.)
The jump from unpredictability to self-determination is a long one, I agree.
But when we define the self as a collection of patterns influenced by other
entities, none of which is fully understood, the validity of the principle of
self-determination hinges on our ignorance. One can only say that if
behavior is unpredictable, we cannot define the limits of its significance.
If individual will appears to be free, for all extensive purposes, one can
accept that it is free.
Does that mean it really is free? As I understand the question, it asks
whether free will is an absolute truth, an entity I've never seen hide nor
hair of. Basically, if one looks for a Universal answer to this question, I
counter, "Universal Truth? Ain't no such animal," and go back to my reading.
------
Now, since I guess I've pitched my tent in Struan's camp on this issue, I'd
like to go on to ask: of what utility is the answer to the question of free
will?
If I assume behavior is determinable, I may, like any psychologist, find
interesting, useful and possibly enlightening relationships between the self
and other entities. If I assume behavior is free, I may, like any
individual, pursue 'X' in my own actions and those of others to my own
edification and delight. Which assumption I make will depend on
circumstance, which is rather my point isn't it? Depending on the
particulars, the answer changes.
Looking forward to your comments,
Scott
MOQ Online Homepage - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Unsubscribe - http://www.moq.org/md/index.html
MD Queries - [EMAIL PROTECTED]
