ROGER RESPONDS TO SCOTT ON FREE WILL
Scott, I have my original quotes using ROGER, and my new quotes labeled as ROG
ROGER [PREVIOUSLY]:
>"Scott, although not quoting you, I believe the above addresses your
>post in entirity. I feel that you are following Struan's lead and
>oversimplifying the free will issue onto the single dimension of
>predictability."
SCOTT:
Actually, in reviewing the recent articles in this thread, I believe Struan's
'oversimplification' to be rather succinct.
ROG:
So you see free will as a "chimera" too?
STRUAN [PREVIOUSLY]:
>"I will stick with the realisation that free will lies in the
>fact that we cannot predict what we are going to do".
SCOTT:
I understood 'we' in
that passage to refer to humanity in general.
ROGER [PREVIOUSLY]:
>"Unpredictableness is not sufficient for free will.... the
>concept of free will also requires self determinism."
SCOTT:
I agree that
unpredictability is not sufficient, by the way.
ROG:
Okay.
SCOTT:
Pirsig wrote: "To the extent that one's
behavior is controlled by static patterns [of Quality, or X, or whatever], it
is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which
is undefinable, one's behavior is free."
To the extent that the pattern of self is influenced and created by patterns
of biology, society and intellect, sure, action of the self is generally
predictable. Further, to the extent that
the self responds to unknown, unmeasured, by definition undefinable stimuli,
action of the self is not predictable.
ROG:
Okay. Do note that you are the first person in a while to step forward and
quote Pirsig on free will. Most of us have disliked his version.
SCOTT:
BUT how much of what is currently unknown will someday be measured, defined
and incorporated into a theory of behavior (or 'action of the self')? We
cannot know. It is reasonable to accept Godel's Theorem, chaos theory,
quantum theory etc. and conclude that there will always be something 'we know
not what' to which one may ascribe free will, since these approach the limits
of our knowledge. But to conclude this to be universally true for all time
is not reasonable to my mind. Does not Pirsig himself imply that truth is a
function of time?
ROG:
What does this have to do with free will? It explains the "illusion of free
will". But this isn't your argument is it?
SCOTT:
The jump from unpredictability to self-determination is a long one, I agree.
But when we define the self as a collection of patterns influenced by other
entities, none of which is fully understood, the validity of the principle of
self-determination hinges on our ignorance. One can only say that if
behavior is unpredictable, we cannot define the limits of its significance.
If individual will appears to be free, for all extensive purposes, one can
accept that it is free.
ROG:
Hmmmmmm.... I guess I agree. But I am not sure.
SCOTT:
Does that mean it really is free? As I understand the question, it asks
whether free will is an absolute truth, an entity I've never seen hide nor
hair of. Basically, if one looks for a Universal answer to this question, I
counter, "Universal Truth? Ain't no such animal," and go back to my reading.
ROG:
I do agree here. I am looking for good explanations of reality. Not reality
itself.
SCOTT:
Now, since I guess I've pitched my tent in Struan's camp on this issue, I'd
like to go on to ask: of what utility is the answer to the question of free
will?
ROG:
I'd be careful who I camp with.
SCOTT:
If I assume behavior is determinable, I may, like any psychologist, find
interesting, useful and possibly enlightening relationships between the self
and other entities. If I assume behavior is free, I may, like any
individual, pursue 'X' in my own actions and those of others to my own
edification and delight. Which assumption I make will depend on
circumstance, which is rather my point isn't it? Depending on the
particulars, the answer changes.
ROG:
Again I agree. The answer changes based on your assumptions. Which
assumptions and answers are the best interpretation? That is the question.
SCOTT:
Looking forward to your comments,
ROG:
And me yours. [Note I am having fun here and keeping it light.]
Roger
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