Greetings,
ROGER:
1) Define free will
The position that human behaviour is not determined by the existential, normative and
factual
conditions alone, but by a combination of that and one's intentions, experiences and
thoughts, that
are subject to modification by the will.
3) Does the MOQ adequately address the free will issue?
No. It reduces the position of what it calls SOM to an argument about physical
determinism which
misses the point. Free will is not, 'the philosophical doctrine that man makes choices
independent
of the atoms in his body.' The question is not even addressed and if that is the
framework of the
question then Pirsig is quite right that in the MoQ it doesn't come up. Of course it
doesn't come up
anywhere else either. The real question does still come up in the MoQ and it remains,
'Can we choose
to follow DQ?' Answers so far have carried on the Pirsigian tradition of missing the
point.
The argument that there is no self and therefore the problem doesn't arise, does
nothing more than
ignore it. We all demonstrably have a self which operates in the world and it is this
operation
that requires an ethical standpoint.
4) As succinctly as possible, what is the resolution to the free will issue?
Our desires, intentions, minds, brains, bodies and environments are all part of one
inseparable
system and all contribute to the direction the system takes, thus the definition above
is fulfilled.
DAVID:
"What difference does it make whether we have free will or not?"
If we have no free will then we have no moral responsibility. While judicial systems
could be
constructed on purely utilitarian grounds, the system of claiming mitigation on
grounds of
diminished responsibility would no longer be tenable. For the MoQ the inquiry into
morals aspect
would be redundant as, without free will, there can be no such thing as morality under
any
reasonable use of the word.
MAGNUS: The quotation about observing was clearly talking about human observation. In
those terms
the world certainly did exist before humans observed it as the fossil record will
testify. Your free
will/randomness argument shows that factors other than the will can cause certain
outcomes in
certain contexts. Fine, that is allowed for in my definition.
RV: Rather than stray from the point vis-�-vis free will I will stick to the quotation
you agreed
with as that made the key point. In my opinion the former quotations led up to it
quite well. You
disagree. No problem, I'll drag it back out again if it is relevant.
PLATT:
You may think it�s nonsense, and most physicists make think it�s nonsense,
but within the context of the MoQ it makes perfect sense. The quotations
you cited from Stephen Hawking and Steve Adams simply reassert the
metaphysical view of determinism held by the majority in the scientific
establishment. But, so what? As Pirsig points out: �You can always
substitute �B values precondition A� for �A causes B� without changing any
facts of science at all.� (Lila, Chap. 8)
Great. I wrote that appeal to quantum physics is pointless and here you are seemingly
agreeing. Your
change is linguistic only and appeal to science will not back it up. We agree.
As for pan-experientialism (or Panpsychism), you must have forgotten that I introduced
this to the
forum over two years ago and I'm pleased that you like it as much now as you did then.
Professor
Roger Sperry is the main man in this field i.e: Sperry R.W -1966- Mind, Brain and
Humanist Values -
Bulletin of Atomic Science 22, 2-6 (Well I never, a Scientist writing about values) or
Sperry R.W -
1976 - Changing concepts of Consciousness and free will - Perspectives in Biology and
Medicine 20,
9-19.
Hey, I'll even throw in a quotation you might like about the perspective to which
Sperry OBJECTED.
"By involved semantics it can be affirmed that no difference exists between mind and
brain, that
they are one and the same, and only seem like two different things because we have
used different
languages and perspectives in our objective and subjective descriptions."
Right on Sperry. Of course this was written before the MoQ so he couldn't mention it
directly but .
. . . . . . . .
The point of Pan-experientialism is, as you rightly point out, to answer the question,
�How can mind
arise from no mind?� Without repeating all of what I wrote here in the past, there is
no doubt that
Pan-experientialism postulates a kind of evolutionary emergent experience in all
things BUT it does
not postulate the existence of free will in everything. Sperry again:
"Conscious phenomena (i.e. free will) are interpreted to be dynamic emergent
properties of brain
activity (and are) different from, more than, and not reducible to the neural
mechanisms of which
they are built.'
Pan-experientialism therefore DOES NOT postulate the existence of free will in
electrons (take note
Platt). It is emergentist.
PETER:
"Lastly, I should just point out that, when explaining magnetism to my 4-year
old, the animistic explanation didn't work; when I said that "this end
(north pole) of this magnet "wanted" to move toward this end (south ) of
this one, he very patiently pointed out that they were made of metal , and
couldn't think. And if they couldn't think, they couldn't want, could
they?"
Thank God for four year olds.
-----------------------------------
SOM?
The hot stove example is where Pirsig sets out his stall with regards to SOM. It is
after accepting
his position here that, 'things become enormously more coherent.' The whole argument
can be
condensed into this one episode. If SOM does what Pirsig claims here then it is a
genuine position.
If it doesn't then it is a strawman. So what does Pirsig claim for this SOM? What
exactly is this
'culturally inherited blindspot'?
PIRSIG:
"Our culture teaches us to think that it is the hot stove which directly causes our
oaths. It
teaches that low values are a property of the person uttering the oaths."
Our culture does not teach us this. It teaches us that the low value is a result of
the relationship
between the stove and the person. It teaches (along with our biology and instinct)
that if we get
off the stove we will be in a higher value situation. The low value is therefore
between the person
and the stove and is perceived as the primary empirical reality of that situation,
(i.e. the first
thing we notice about the relationship). What our culture does not do is teach us that
we can then
make the leap from here to value creating subjects and objects. It does not teach this
because there
is no reason whatsoever to think this. There is no logical connection.
For Pirsig the grave error of SOM is to try and, 'assign them (values) to subjects and
objects.' If
that is what SOM does then SOM is a strawman. The whole of the rest of Lila rests upon
this invented
fight with a mythical enemy for its support. Without this fight and the invented
problems derived
from it, the MOQ would be left with the 'ad hoc' hypothesis that Quality is the font
of all things.
This is, of course, a position which many have held over the last few thousand years
and a worthy
position it is too. Having said that, it is not scientific or backed up by any
empirical evidence
and had it not been for the battle between the MOQ and SOM very, very few people would
have bought
the book and this forum would probably not exist. It is a literary device and no more
and it relies
upon 'convoluted semantics' to establish itself with the suggestible.
Struan
------------------------------------------
Struan Hellier
< mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
"All our best activities involve desires which are disciplined and
purified in the process."
(Iris Murdoch)
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