ROGER CHATS ABOUT TRUTH, THE SELF AND FREE WILL To Platt, Matthew, John and Denis, with references to others...... Denis wrote: "Of course empirical verification is good, since it means our model (intPoV) is close to an actual pattern of value." Platt wrote: "I’m interested in what you see as the distinction between truth and belief in truth, and what your standards for determining truth (or belief in truth) are...... This appears to be similar to Matthew’s version of truth, and to me it seems to come close to saying truth is mere opinion. But, I could be wrong. Denis, would you care to comment on Matthew’s version, and vice versa? Are we stuck with the self-contradictory statement: ‘It’s true we can never know what’s really true’?" Matthew wrote: "....there are nevertheless facts "out there" that are independent of belief." Roger replies to all 3: Welcome Matthew! I have enjoyed hearing your new voice in this forum. I must jump in and offer that I believe all three of you are on a tangent of 'truth' that differs from the MOQ and its roots in radical empiricism. To paraphrase William James, truth concerns statements-about-reality, not reality (or in Platt's words, "what's really true"). Statements can be true, but reality just is. Also, I was amazed to see Denis write the first sentence above. (Though David B. might approve). I would suggest that within the MOQ the words 'actual pattern of value' should be replaced with 'experience'. Pirsig carefully warns us in chapter 8 about seeking 'absolute truth' corresponding to the 'objective' world (note Pirsig puts 'objective' in parenthesis). Denis: "...what if free will is judged by the MOQ as a bad intellectual pattern, better replaced by "the result of a conflict of patterns" ? I've proposed this and would like you to criticize it, since you are the one to have proposed the conflict. I've substracted the "identifying with one pattern over another", because, like Struan, I couldn't see what exactly did identify with the patterns. How does this impact the MOQ for you, Roger ?..... So once such a proposition has been determined to be the best, either by any individual or by a group, the logically opposed must be rejected as ‘bad,’ or the MOQ is preaching for cultural relativism." Roger I was not clear. I see your perspective on free will as having value. Free will can be explained away as conflicts in values. My thoughts concur with Peter's opinion on the issue not being absolute. Experience is. The statements we build and the intellectual patterns we form should be judged on their consistency, simplicity, elegance, conclusiveness and ability to highlight new understandings. When two statements appear contradictory, but both seem of hi-quality within their individual contexts, the challenge is to pursue new theories that harmonize the qualities of both. Even if unsuccessful, I believe the MOQ teaches we should try to find the value from each perspective. (And this is not cultural relativism.) As Pirsig states in Chapter 8, intellectual realities can be examined like paintings in an art gallery "not with an effort to find out which is the 'real' painting, but simply to enjoy and keep those that are of value." John: "If Pirsig is right, and experience is primary, how is it we can judge some experiences (such as selfhood and free will) to be illusory?" Roger: Selfhood and free will are not direct experience. They are descriptions of patterns of experience. Direct experience is DQ. Patterns derived from direct experience are sq. I am not trying to be anal here, John, but this distinction is critical to the MOQ. It is closely related to my comments to the 3 folks above as well, for base reality is direct experience. John: "Not that I am saying this is a pseudo question, as I do take fantasy to be a meaningful term. There is a sense in which the 'little editor' self is a fantasy, and the mystics are no doubt right to critique it, though sadly they have not been able to provide me with experiences to convert me to their view. Like Owen, my experiences which I label self and freedom of choice are at least as real as my other experiences, and are often most powerful and disturbing. Telling me they are illusory does not change that." Roger: I think it would be more useful within the context of this conversation to call the self a hi-quality intellectual pattern or description of experience. Again, W. James clarifies the distinctions well in his explorations of the nature of consciousness. The self and the world are two patterns that are derived from pure experience. John: "The really big question is whether separation is best handled by avoiding it, seeking to numb down the awareness that goes with it, and seeking solace in mystic union, or by accepting separation as real, the mind as real in its own domain, choice as real as it seems to be, and moving on to explore contact, dialogue and encounter, respecting my self as much as those other selves with whom I appear to share a planet. I like the thought of transcending the ego constriction of my self, and I'll let you know when I find the way, but I don't wish to, nor can I, simply deny my experience of self as an agent, whose choices count." Roger: The self and the external universe are useful patterns. Rather than giving up on either, just quit thinking and experience. Don't you ever get so caught up in the flow of sculpting that you lose all track of yourself and your art? That is what Pirsig is talking about. Roger PS -- Note that Matthew has come down on the side of the free will dilemma being rooted in problems with the traditional views of 'self'. If anyone else disagrees with this view as being espoused by David B., David T., Rich, Matthew, Denis, myself, and (arguably) Struan, could they speak up? MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/ MD Queries - [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at: http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
