MOqdis
The slow reading of the first 3 chapters of LILA is
about to begin over on moq_focus. Before we begin
I'll just point out what I think is wrong with the book
and what I hope our reading of it will resolve.
Lila is over four hundred pages long, but still Pirsig
only has time to sketch out a metaphysics. The problems
I have with his work mainly relate to the big
philosophical questions which are touched on but not
explained in anything like the depth that they require.
We tend to ask specific questions in this group, which
is fine, but then we get caught in traps because we
don�t really know how to deal with the underlying
metaphysics and Pirsig imo just doesn�t offer enough
explanation to support the claims he makes.
The questions which I think need answered, and I mean
properly, are:
The nature of the self.
The grande free will non-sequitur isn�t just a typo, it�s
a genuine contradiction in the theory. The thing that
worries me is, why did he make such a mistake? The
self isn�t really dealt with in LILA. All we get is
�no little editors� and a �convergence of patterns�.
Is that all he wrote because he didn�t have time or
because he couldn�t write any more? Or maybe it's not
really a mistake at all, I don't know, it just isn't
clear.
Causation
I know Pirsig does reject this, but it�s such a huge
topic. A few paragraphs just aren�t enough to explore
the implications of it all. It has implications for
free will as well, but he doesn�t deal with that either.
Quality and dynamic quality
Dynamic quality in LILA assumes the role of Quality
in ZMM. Maybe it�s just me, but I think the distinction
between the two isn�t clear.
The intellectual level
We have such terrible problems trying to define it.
The more you try to pin it down the more it slips away.
The computational theory of the mind
Pirsig compares the levels to the levels of a computer.
I suppose he doesn�t mean that that�s exactly what they
are like, but it�s a good enough approximation. But I
think maybe this is misleading. From what I�ve read
on theories of the evolution of the mind, the brain isn�t
a general operating system upon which you can run
just about any software. As far as I know there was a
time when it was believed that this was the way the brain worked, but more recent
theories of the brain describe it
as having a series of �organs� for social learning, language, reasoning and so on.
Perhaps the MOQ can still fit this paradigm, but it would need some adjustment.
Truth
Again, it just isn�t dealt with in enough detail. We
need to look at what we mean by this concept and what
Pirsig�s opinion is on it.
Space-time
Even more than causation and truth seem real, space
and time seem so obviously out there we can hardly
doubt them. But the Dynamic-static split takes place
outside of space-time, or does it? I don�t see that
Pirsig�s dealt with it at all.
Substance
Pirsig refers to the discontinuity of matter at the
quantum level. And he brings this up again in SODV.
But it seems so incomplete to me. The quantum level
is unexplained and dynamic quality is unexplained,
so maybe they�re the same thing? Yes, maybe, and
maybe not. We need some proper exploration of this.
And I'm sure there's more..
Diana
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