Everyone Pirsig's many sets of truth idea, which he expounds in chapter 8 is about profound truths about the nature of reality - metaphysical truths, not conflicting values. Not that there isn't such a thing as conflicting values, but that isn't what he's getting at when he talks about truths. David's example about infidelity is something that anyone of any culture can understand. It doesn't take a new metaphysical paradigm to explain it and the SOM doesn't deny conflicting values, even if it doesn't actually call them that. And the fact that Clinton won't be president next year doesn't need a new paradigm either. The SOM doesn't deny that things change over time. Pirsig introduces the idea specifically to show that the MOQ doesn't invalidate the SOM. He talks about different "constructions of things", different "sets of truths", different "intellectual realities" and different "intellectual patterns for interpreting reality". He doesn't actually use the phrase "many truths" that I can find (pls point it out if he does). He offers the SOM as one example of a set of truths and the MOQ as another example. And he implies that there may be other sets which may also be valid. The kind of truth that he's talking about is metaphysical truths about what things exist, what is their nature and relationship. Is time an arrow or a cycle? Are things divided or separate? Do we have free will or not? Is it a truth that all things should realize their true nature? And it's also the truth that we should transcend our true nature? Yes, that's a contradiction but both are truths in a real and profound sense. I think Platt's "Catches" if they're still around, might have some more examples of paradoxical truths. Diana MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/ MD Queries - [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at: http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
