ROGER AGREES WITH DAVID THAT WE
NEED TO GO BACK TO WHY WE ARE
REJECTING PIRSIG'S FREE WILL SOLUTION
DMB:
It seems the discussion began with an outright rejection of Pirsig's
answer on the issue. (He says the question doesn't really come up and then
describes freedom in terms of the static/Dyanmic split. You all know the
quote by heart, I'm sure.) But this answer was rejected without any real
discussion of its meaning. No one really gave an explaination for their
disagreement.
ROGER:
We just failed to reprint old ground. Rich, Struan, Horse, Diana and I have
all rejected Pirsig's Free will logic in the past. Below are two of my prior
posts on the issue.
*************************May 2nd 1999 POST***********************************
"I needed to step away from the free will issue for a few days and gain fresh
perspective. I guess I was too caught up in stable patterns . Now I'm
back, and I see the issue in a new light.
What has suddenly occurred to me is that Pirsig changes the concepts in the
middle of his free will/determinism platypus. Free will ( as we usually
think of it) is being independent and able to "choose freely." Pirsig starts
with this definition when explaining the platypus, but then does a quick
redefinition at the end to "choosing freedom."
"To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of
quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic
quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free" (p180)
By doing this, Pirsig equates freedom with pursuit of dynamic quality, with
his "code of art", and hence with Kevin's pursuit of mysticism. On the other
hand, he evaded the original question. Namely, how free are we to choose
dynamic quality rather than static patterns? I believe the MOQ does resolve
this issue, and I would like to run a solution by you. Then I will loop back
to Pirsig's extended definition of Free Will.
Before starting on free will though, I would like to mention that determinism
is no longer even an SOM platypus. Quantum mechanics and complexity theory
have both shown that the universe is not deterministic. Similar to the MOQ,
these theories explain reality in terms of probabilities, tendencies, and
attractors. In other words, as "value."
As for free will, I believe the MOQ explains away the issue without having to
"choose to pursue dynamic quality". To address the issue, I relied heavily on
my favorite radical empiricist Zen philosopher, Kitaro Nishida. Nishida
defines Free Will as the uniting of desired experience with experience. The
will is seen as a unifying process. Seen this way, the Will is a pattern's
ability to actualize value. The will is value, and free will is unencumbered
value.
For example, a single celled organism wills and values the experience of
sunlight, and brings forth this experience. In SOM terms, it moves to the
light. This is free will.
Nishida writes:
"We usually contend that the will is free. But what is this so-called
freedom?...... We think we can freely desire anything, but that simply means
that it is possible for us to desire..... It is not so much that "I" produce
desires, but that actualized patterns are none other than me."
In other words, "I" am realized value patterns. I think Pirsig should have
shown that the Free Will of SOM is some type of theoretical value
independence. But patterns are not independent. In fact, a truly
independent pattern would have no value and thus not exist. Diana wrote
something along this line last Fall, and suggested that Free Will implies a
free subject. It is probably more accurate to say that a value is free than
that a subject is free.
The real world is neither deterministic nor composed of completely
independent patterns. Entities are composed of value patterns, which are
patterns of actualized will. Free will is the ability of a value pattern to
actualize itself.
*****************END MD QUOTE MAY 2ND************************************
**************NOV 5 1999MF QUOTE*****************************
I also agree with Horse that the determinism/free will issue is the more
interesting causation dilemma. Especially since so many of us have long
scoffed at Pirsig's feeble attempt to kill this platypus.
This issue has come up a half dozen times or more in the Squad's history, and
in my opinion, the best solutions have gone against the very meaning of the
words 'Free Will". From a conventional standpoint,' free will' is an
oxymoron. Your 'will' is that which you are 'determined to do', yet
'freedom' is that which is 'not determined.' Put these together and you have
'undetermined determination.'
>From the opposite angle, will that is not caused or determined is not
'willed,' it is chance or random or fortuitous. And nobody considers chance
as a sign of volition. Do you see how convoluted the expression 'free will'
can be?
My guess is that you already see what is wrong with the above twisted
definitions. There is an undefined term that is implied with 'free will.'
The key unstated ingredient is a subject. When we speak of 'free will' we
speak of a subject's freedom in an otherwise separate, objective world.
Subject/object definitions are emasculated from solving this issue due to
this fundamental schism..
The MOQ can come to our rescue though, for we are no longer just 'subjects',
we are better defined as 'patterns of value'. Interestingly enough, I think
you will agree that 'will' is a value pattern as well. Free will is hence
defined as agreement between patterns of value. Free will is the consistency
of our definitions of self and desire.
Have I lost you? Let me give examples:
1) "I don't want to eat that chocolate cake, but I just can't resist."
2) "I try so hard not to gossip, but...."
3) 'I want to go to the movies, but my parents told me to clean the yard
first."
In all of these cases, we are defining our 'self' differently from the
dominant value pattern. In the first, I (my social image-conscious self)
doesn't want to eat, but the biological self (which I have defined away from
my 'true' self) does. In the second, the social gossiper differs from the
intellectual abstraction of myself. In the third, I am defining myself as
separate from the will of my parents (a reasonable distinction in a
subject/object metaphysics), yet at the same time, I am willingly choosing to
follow their guidance. I could also give examples of where my biological and
social self want something, but an inorganic value pattern interferes.
The point is that we are our values. To paraphrase Kitaro Nishida ......" It
is more accurate to say we belong to our values than to say our values belong
to us." The definition of YOU is determined by those values which you choose
to define yourself by. When your definition of you matches with the
predominant value pattern, it is 'free will'. When it doesn't, it is
'against your will.'
'Will' is a term for subjective patterns of value. "I" is a term for
subjective patterns of value. When the two agree , we call it free will.
When differing or conflicting, we call it determination, or chance or
'against our will'.
***********************END OF NOV 5 MF QUOTE*********************
ROG:
David, the issue is whether we can choose or not. Not whether we choose DQ or
one of two patterns. In fact, as I understand DQ it could be better defined
as 'choice' rather than 'any particular choice'. And this is indeed the
issue of free will. Do I have the freedom OF WILL? Do I have the freedom of
choice?
DMB:
I would like to challenge each and every member to provide thoughts about
Pirsig's answer.
Why doesn't it come up? How is choosing one static pattern over another
NOT free?
ROG:
This clearly is free. Please do explain how choosing to take the path to the
left vs the path to the right is not free. And let me know your concerns
with my refutation of his proposed resolution of the issue.
DMB:
He suggests that it [free will] has to be understood in terms of the
static/Dynamic
split and that reference is a solid clue as to why it doesn't come up.
ROG:
I think he botched the explanation.
DMB:
There is something awfully modern about the free-will issue. Its an
enlightenment thing, caught somewhere between the Church's moral testing
ground and the mechanistic determinism of Newtonian physics. The traditional
kind of free will issue is an SOM platypus. It rests on the idea that
subjects are acting in a pre-existing world. It rests on the same old
Cartesian dualism.
And Rich is right, as usual, in pointing out the the individual person is so
radically different in the MOQ that the old questions about free will just
don't make sense anymore.
ROG:
In the end I am sure you recognize that I agree completely with your
conclusion. It is the particular path to the conclusion elaborated by Pirsig
that bothers me. Rich I agree with on this one, Pirsig I don't.
Roger
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