�Mysticism and Logic� by Bertrand Russell, pub'd by George Allen & Unwin
Ltd., London, 1970
---
The following quotes are from pages 9 to 30:
�Metaphysics, or the attempt to conceive the world as a whole by means of
thought, has been developed, from the first, by the union and conflict of
two very different human impulses, the one urging men towards mysticism, the
other urging them towards science...
But the greatest men who have been philosophers have felt the need both of
science and of mysticism: the attempt to harmonize the two was what made
their life, and what always must, for all its arduous uncertainty, make
philosophy, to some minds, a greater thing than either science or religion.
---
[from Plato's analogy of the Cave, in the "Republic" - a must read for those
interested in Phaedrus' development of ideas]:
�In the world of knowledge, the essential Form of the Good is the limit of
our enquiries, and can barely be perceived; but, when perceived, we cannot
help concluding that it is in every case the source of all that is bright
and beautiful, - in the visible world giving birth to light and its master,
and in the intellectual world dispensing, immediately and with full
authority, truth and reason; - and that whosoever would act wisely, either
in private or in public, must set this Form of Good before his eyes.�
But in this passage, as throughout most of Plato�s teaching, there is an
identification of the good with the truly real, which became embodied in the
philosophical tradition, and is still largely operative in our own day. In
thus allowing a legislative function to the good, Plato produced a divorce
between philosophy and science, from which, in my opinion, both have
suffered ever since and are still suffereing. The man of science, whatever
his hopes may be, must lay them aside while he studies nature; and the
philosopher, if he is to achieve truth must do the same. Ethical
considerations can only legitimately appear when the truth has been
ascertained: they can and should appear as determining our feeling towards
the truth, and our manner of ordering our lives in view of this truth, but
not as themselves dictating what the truth is to be...
---
A process which led from the amoeba to Man appeared to the philosopher to be
obviously a progress - though whether the amoeba would agree with this
opinion is not known. Hence the cycle of changes which science had shown to
be the probable history of the past was welcomed as revealing a law of
development towards good in the universe - an evolution or unfolding of an
idea slowly embodying itself in the actual. But such a view, though it might
satisfy Spencer and those whom we may call Hegelian evolutionists, could not
be accepted as adequate by the more whole-hearted votaries of change. An
ideal to which the world continuously approaches is, to these minds, too
dead and static to be inspiring. Not only the aspiration, but the ideal too,
must change and develop with the course of evolution: there must be no fixed
goal, but a continual fashioning of fresh needs by the impulse which is life
and which alone gives unity to the process.
Life, in this philosophy, is a continuous stream, in which all divisions are
artificial and unreal. Separate things, beginnings and endings, are mere
convenient fictions: there is only smooth unbroken transition. The beliefs
of today may count as true today, if they carry us along the stream; but
tomorrow they will be false, and must be replaced by new beliefs to meet the
new situation. All our thinking consists of convenient fictions, imaginary
congealings of the stream: reality flows on in spite of all our fictions,
and though it can be lived, it cannot be conceived in thought. Somehow,
without explicit statement, the assurance is slipped in that the future,
though we cannot foresee it, will be better than the past or the present:
the reader is like the child which expects a sweet because it has been told
to open its mouth and shut its eyes. Logic, mathematics, physics disappear
in this philosophy, because they are too 'static'; what is real is no
impulse and movement towards a goal which, like the rainbow, recedes as we
advance, and makes every place different when it reaches it from what it
appeared to be at a distance.
I do not propose to enter upon a technical examination of this philosophy. I
wish only to maintain that the motives and interests which inspire it are so
exclusively practical, and the problems with which it deals are so special,
that it can hardly be regarded as touching any oof the questions that, to my
mind, constitute genuine philosophy...
---
�in order to understand the ethical outlook of mysticism: there is a lower
mudane kind of good and evil, which divides the world of appearance into
what seem to be conflicting parts; but there is also a higher, mystical kind
of good, which belongs to Reality and is not opposed by any correlative kind
of evil.
It is difficult to give a logically tenable account of this position without
recognizing that good and evil are subjective, that what is good is merely
that towards which we have one kind of feeling, and what is evil is merely
that towards which we have another kind of feeling. In our active life,
where we have to exercise choice, and to prefer this to that of two possible
acts, it is necessary to hve a distinction of good and evil, or at least of
better and worse. But this distinction, like everything pertaining to
action, belongs to what mysticism regards as the world of illusion, if only
because it is essentially concerned with time. In our contemplative life,
where action is not called for, it is possible to be impartial, and to
overcome the ethical dualism which action requires. So long as we remain
merely impartial, we may be content to say that both the good and the evil
of action are illusions. But if, as we must do if we have the mystic vision,
we find the whole world worthy of love and worship�we shall say that there
is a higher good than that of action, and that this higher good belongs to
the whole world as it is in reality. In this way the twofold attitude and
the apparent vacillation of mysticism are explained and justified.
The possibility of this universal love and joy in all that exists is of
supreme importance for the conduct and happiness of life, and gives
inestimable value to the mystic emotion, apart from any creeds which may be
built upon it. But if we are not to be led into false beliefs, it is
necessary to realize exactly what the mystic emotion reveals. It reveals a
possibility of human nature � a possibility of a nobler, happier, freer life
than any that can be otherwise achieved. But it does not reveal anything
about the non-human, or about the nature of the universe in general. Good
and bad, and even the higher good that mysticism finds everywhere, are the
reflections of our own emotions on other things, not part of the substance
of things as they are in themselves. And therefore an impartial
contemplation, freed from all preoccupation with Self, will not judge things
good or bad, although it is very easily combined with that feeling of
universal love which leads the mystic to say that the whole world is good.
The philosophy of evolution, through the notion of progress, is bound up
with the ethical dualism of the worse and the better, and is thus shut out,
not only from the kind of survey which discards good and evil altogether
from its view, but also from the mystical belief in the goodness of
everything. In this way the distinction of good and evil, like time, are, it
would seem, not general or fundamental in the world of thought, but late and
highly specialized members of the intellectual hierarchy.
Although, as we saw, mysticism can be interpreted so as to agree with the
view that good and evil are not intellectually fundamental, it must be
admitted that here we are no longer in verbal agreement with most of the
great philosophers and reigious teachers of the past. I believe, however,
that the elimination of ethical considerations from philosophy is both
scientifically necessary and � though this may seem a paradox � an ethical
advance...
Human beings cannot, of course, wholly transcend human nature; something
subjective, if only the interest that determines the direction of our
attention, must remain in all our thought. But scientific philosophy comes
nearer to objectivity than any other human pursuit, and gives us, therefore,
the closest constant and the most intimate relation with the outer world
that it is possible to achieve...
Love and hate, for example are ethical opposites, but to philosophy they are
closely analogous attitudes towards objects. The general form and structure
of those attitudes towards objects which constitute mental phenomena is a
problem for philosophy, but the difference between love and hate is not a
difference of form or structure, and therefore belongs rather to the special
science of psychology than to philosophy. Thus the ethical interests which
have often inspired philosophers must remain in the background: some kind of
ethical interest may inspire the whole study, but none must obtrude in the
detail or be expected in the special results which are sought...
It is only during the last century that an ethically neutral psychology has
grown up; and here too, ethical neutrality has been essential to scientific
success.
Driven from the particular sciences, the belief that the notions of good and
evil must afford a key to the understanding of the world has sought a refuge
in philosophy. But even from this last refuge, if philosophy is not to
remain a set of pleasing dreams, this belief must be driven forth...
The good which it concerns us to remember is the good which it lies in our
power to create - the good in our own lives and in our attitude towards the
world. Insistence on belief in an external realization of the good is a form
of self-assertion, which, while it cannot secure the external good which it
desires, can seriously impair the inward good which lies within our power,
and destroy that reverence towards fact which constitutes both what is
valuable in humility and what is fruitful in the scientific temper.
Evolutionism, in spite of its appeals to particular scientific facts, fails
to be a truly scientific philosophy because of its slavery to time, its
ethical preoccupations, and its predominant interest in our mundane concerns
and destiny. A truly scientific philosophy will be more humbel, more
piecemeal, more arduous, offering less glitter of outward mirage to flatter
fallaciuos hopes, but more indifferent to fate, and more capable of
accepting the world without the tyrannous imposition of our human and
temporary demands.
---
Pages 82-83:
"To regard ethical notions as a key to the understanding of the world is
essentially pre-Copernican. Ethical metaphysics is fundamentally an attempt,
however disguised, to give legislative force to our own wishes...Ethics is
essentially a product of the gregarious instinct, that is to say, of the
instinct to co-operate with those who are to form our own group against
those who belongs to other groups...The view of the world taken by the
philosophy derived from ethical notions is thus never impartial and
therefore never fully scientific. As compared with science, it fails to
achieve the imaginative liberation from self which is necessary to such
understanding of the world as man can hope to achieve, and the philosophy
which it inspires is always more or less parochial, more or less infected
with the prejudices of a time and a place."
-------
hmmm...
"Not just life, but everything, is an ethical activity." (Lila)
-------
More apples and oranges:
--see also Russel's "History of Western Philosophy", especially the
introduction and chapters on Descartes, Bergson and James.
--Plato's "Gorgias" and "Phaedrus" are of inestimable value in appraising
the "awful scholarship" of the Phaedrus of ZAMM.
--read Aristotle's "Metaphysics" (at least the beginning). I think you'll
find that, apart from his views on rhetoric, this philosopher put in writing
the foundations for building an ethical metaphysics such as the MOQ. Or,
just read a reputable account of his doctrine of the four causes.
--see "The Psychology of Man's Possible Evolution" by P.D.Ouspensky for an
opposing view to that of Russel's on the value of "neutrality" in
psychological method and principles, or if you're just looking for some good
work to do. (the people, at least in the one in Toronto, who form schools of
the Fourth Way, seem to be on the right track, or the "rta track", you might
say. They have centers worldwide - though you might want to be careful when
the topics of so-called "Astral planes" and whatnot come up - to avoid that
NOT-mystical pitfall, read, critically, the work of William Q. Judge and
Annie Besant - caretaker of Krishnamurti for a period, the majority of whose
ideas he (rt-ly) rejected. Theosophism does offer some good insights into
the MOQ, it just gets a lot silly in places)
--"Zen and the Brain" by James Austin. If you are scientifically-minded, yet
interested too in mysticism per theory and practice, and obviously you find
some value in the MOQ, then this could change your life as dramatically as
ZAMM and LILA have done for many of the participants in these discussions.
--Spinoza's geometrical metaphysical system of ethics offers great points of
comparison with Phaedrus', as of course does that of Hegel also.
--Eliot Deutsch's "Advaita Vedanta - a philosophical reconstruction" should
offer lots of room for seeing Pirsig's metaphysics from the Eastern
perspective, and understanding some difficult abstract questions relating to
the relation between spovs and DQ and "Quality", and help in judging the
worth of Russel's points of view as expressed in the essays found in
"Mysticism and Logic".
--conversely, read the "Chuang-Tzu" (a great Chinese Taoist), for views
which at times contradict B.R. and at times agree with him, but almost
always provide strong criticism of Phaedrus' and like projects.
--oh, of course it is quite impossible to gain a full understanding of what
"Quality" is in ZAMM without reading for yourself the "Tao Te Ching". I
suggest Stan Rosenthal's translation, or for those more mystically-oriented,
try that of Aleister Crowley - if you can't find it, but read up on him, and
if you think you'd like a go at his work, I will mail you a copy - but I'm
warning you, it's, uh... well, "weird", from a classical point of view.
Very, very deep and subtle from the romantic.
--"The Book - on the taboo against knowing who you are", by Alan Watts,
explains far better than Pirsig did the underlying structure and problems of
subject/object dualism, and offers a great contrast to some of Bertrand
Russell's views. Anything else, at all, by Watts, is highly recommended. His
ideas are a good introduction to those of Wilber's.
See ya later!
====
Oh - might as well fly two birds with one wing:
I and another are organizing some sort of conference of those interested in
further understanding and applying the MOQ. It's a premature idea at the
moment, but the plan is to meet in the Netherlands next August, and have all
interested present papers (or, if shy of public speaking, have their papers
presented by others) and join smaller, focused discussion groups, or just
listen and learn. Naturally, the outline would be more dynamic than static.
The purpose, beyond merely meeting others with similar interests and having
live conversations, is to achieve some static-latching, in as dynamic a
method as possible, and look for concrete applications of the MOQ. If you
would like to attend, or produce an essay/diagram/whatever to be presented,
and/or would like to help in the production of this possible event, please
email me. I thought now would be a good time to begin seeing if there is
enough interest, and also to give time for location and travel arrangements,
etc. Hopefully, accomodation will be provided free of charge. We'll see.
Maybe it's still too early for this kind of thing. What'd'you think?
Good-bye for now
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