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Part 2
The question of course of wether then '
reality ' ' exists ' or not is rather
silly/ fallacious and useless. It is impossible to
prove either way because
the very thing I use to know that is inself the
thing whose ability to know
that produces the impossibility to do that...our
brain.
However in a sense the existence of memes can
' t than be prooven either.
Why do good things for other people if you think
they don ' t really exist,
are merely part of your imagination; and why should
we hand in wallets
found on the street if neither the street, the
wallet nor the person suppo-
singly owning the wallet does memetical exist, does
not correspond
with my reality !?
What is then the purpose of the search into
memetics if I can have memes
which deny the existence of other people and even
deny their memes !?
What is the purpose of our/ my cultural environment
if firstly culture as we/
I know it, don ' t really exist and secondly why
should we/ I bother at all if all
what exists is merely a mirror image of our/ my
mind !?
Anyway, ideas can have the same underlying form as
f. e. morphogenetic
fields. In the same sense that those came (ex-
hypothesis) into being,
ideas can have their base in the unconscious mind,
and thus no fixed
grounding.
The concept of an idea ( if there is one ) would be simply ' from its own case '. Therfor it can be demonstrated that '
reality ' does not possess
any logical scope in reference to the ' ideas
' we all have.
That is, uniformation ( all ideas are intented
units of the internal structure
of ( a ) reality is greatly depending on the
content/ context and is thus
partly due ( if we decompose the structure)
to cognitive and evolutionary
processes within the a single
individual.
Such conclusions are the result of three
philosophical pre- suppositions,
A_ that what I know is certainly the content of my
own mind ( memes)
B_ that there is no conceptual or logically
necessary link between the
mental and the physical ( the idea that there has
to be no logical link
between the memetical activity of my mind and the
behavioural disposi-
tions of my body) and
C_ that the ( memetical) experiences of a given
person are necessarily
private to that person ( Idit Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy)
( These reflections can be prooven wrong, but those
conclusions are of
no importance to this article.)
These pre- suppositions are making it indeed the
collectiviness, the
sameness very hard_ in a sense it don 't really
exists, but where in the
first place is the problem ( if we ever can talk
about one ) of collectiviness/
sameness coming from !?
End of part Two
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