Hi Peter:
You wrote:
> this thing about being in possession of 'qualities' is generally a thorn in
> the side, whether one is considering the 'doggishness of the dog' (finding
> the general in the particular) or the quality of blue-ness. I must say, i
> have a real problem with the whole notion of intrinsic properties (qualities
> residing in things) - it reflects some deep conceptual inability, I feel. It
> does seem much easier to say the quality has the thing every bit as much as
> the thing has the quality. And that's without capitalising the 'Q'.
> The stopgap proposals such 'quality occurs in the interaction', or resides
> in the holistic thing-medium-perciever loop don't really do it for me.
> Thinking about qualities as properties of the 'real' physical, concrete
> world seems to be like pushing water uphill.
I agree. The hoary argument about whether beauty is in the eye of
the beholder or resides in the object perceived solely arises from
the SOM paradigm. In the MOQ, the question doesn�t arise
because beauty (Quality) is a separate category from subjects or
objects. What�s more, subjects and objects are sub-categories of
Quality, as are dynamic and static quality.
How you divide Quality (pure awareness) is the major issue facing
metaphysicians, but most never question or even mention the
SOM division. They simply assume it. Pirsig is the first
philosopher in history to talk unambiguously about the �first slice�
the �first cut� and to question the SOM assumption in no uncertain
terms. Pirsig writes:
�There already is a metaphysics of Quality. A subject-object
metaphysics is in fact a metaphysics in which the first division of
Quality�the first slice of undivided experience�is into subjects
and objects. Once you have made that slice, all of human
experience is supposed to fit into one of these two boxes. The
trouble is, it doesn't. What he had seen is that there is a
metaphysical box that sits above these two boxes. Quality itself.
And once he'd seen this he also saw a huge number of ways in
which Quality can be divided. Subjects and objects are just one of
the ways.� (Lila, Chap.9)
We still often hear, �Beauty is in the eye of beholder.� Whenever
someone uses that little word �in� you know they are in SOM mode
(as I am at the moment). �In� and it�s opposite, �out,� are brief
forms of �inside� and �outside.� From that simple division comes
Idealism (inside) and Materialism (outside) along with a host of
other SOM divisions that are rarely, if ever, questioned.
A little exercise to show the ultimate futility of SOM is the following:
What�s the mind in?
The brain.
What�s the brain in?
The body.
What�s the body in?
The world.
What�s the world in?
The universe.
What�s the universe in?
The mind.
If anyone wonders why philosophy had pretty much being going
nowhere before Pirsig, the �in� word holds a provocative clue.
As you said:, � . . . the whole notion of intrinsic properties (qualities
residing in things)�reflects some deep conceptual inability.�
Right on.
Platt
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