Roger, let me correct one sentence of my precedent post. I wrote that Pirsig "talks about the "hippy" movement as intellectual" In the same moment I posted the message, I saw the mistake. In this case, I'm wrong. Surely. In the sense that Pirsig talks about this movement as anti-intellectual and anti-social. Sorry. Pirsig just says that many intellectuals had sympathies for the hippies. There's a difference. So I retire my question, and repost the correct message: _____________________________________________________ Hi Roger thanks for your message. I split my answer in two, as two are the main threads: Intellect, language and animals (this message) Intellect and art (coming soon) ROG: I agree that language (abstract messaging with shared verbal or written signs) is not biological. We are in total agreement here. I would say that it is probably social though. I could be wrong though (what's new?) so, please argue back with me on this one. Children, Cro-Magnon's and "savages' all have, or had, effective and complex language. Certainly language presupposes some type of primitive society (to paraphrase Popper), but considering its roots into antiquity, it seems to miss any of the characteristics of an intellectual pattern. MARCO: Did I ever write that language IS intellectual? I don't remember. If I did, I was under the effect of drugs :-). Language is social. Just like DNA is inorganic. I'm saying that intellectual patterns need a code , like language, to simply exist. If we just talk about the weather, our interaction is purely social. But how can it be possible to have an intellectual interaction without a shareable code? An intellectual pattern must be socially shareable, and language makes it possible. MARCO (previous post): I love pets, so I don't want to deny them the possibility of being intelligent. So I change the subject. The water has a biological value for a tree, but no "meaning". OK NOW? :-) ROG: No, it isn't. I cannot argue for a tree, but I think "meaning" does exist for advanced mammals. MARCO: Ok, no problem. Let's try this. IMO "meaning" is a step beyond language. My example about the tree was an answer to your equivalence: meaning=value: (ROG:=> Is something that has no meaning THAT different from something with no value?) I already tried to explain the difference between "meaning" and "significance"... of course I agree we are just talking about value, in MOQ terms. But, "The value that holds a glass of water together and the value that holds a nation together are obviously not the same thing" (Lila chapter 12) . My point was (and is) that intellectual static pattern of value are not equivalent to inorganic or biologic or social static patterns of value (according to the MOQ). I define IntPoVs as made of code (social support), and significance (intellectual value). So my usage of "meaning" or, better, "significance" points to a sort of kind of static value. I know that for you it's not enough. You ask also for a method of creating and testing this "meaning", to claim it as intellectual value. If I well understand your point, what I call intPoV must be refined to become what you call intPoV. Refined by a methodic process known as science. Right? Going back to the water and the tree, IMO water has a biologic value to a tree, but it's not easy to claim that it has a meaning for the tree. It's like to say, on another level, that water has an inorganic value when it extinguishes a flame, but not necessarily a "meaning". Finally, water has for me a biologic value (thirst calming). AND an intellectual value (H2O). But the biologic value and the intellectual value are not the same. This is not Philosophy. It's common sense. :-) ROGER: I think biological creatures can identify patterns. I think communication involves social interaction between biological patterns, and language involves abstracted social communication. MARCO: Here we agree. There's an interesting paper by an Italian thinker: Piero Trupia, this month on an Italian magazine. I translate it as I can. He is talking about his cat Cassius. <<Since when Cassius had its tail crushed by the door, every time he passes the doorstep accelerates his walk. Cassius is intelligent, he's a technician. But he is not rational, he has not a "meta" look. By the "meta" look, the man abstracts, generalizes; sees the "horseness", not only horses; links purpose with end, and this end can be a pure creative invention, an absolute event>>. Indeed, many animals are very intelligent. And they can communicate. But it's probable that this "meta" look, that is the ability to generalize and create intellectual patterns is only human (even if it's not easy to say where is the human-non human frontier: Chimps, Cro-Magnon, Spice Girls...?) He could be wrong. Maybe cats can see the "dogness" ... but it's not sure. Surely trees can't. However this is intellect: the ability to analyze reality by means of "links to" and "descriptions of" (idea=Greek eidos: image); to generalize experience and create explanations of reality; to put those explanations on some support out of a biologic individual, in order to make them persist even in absence of the individual and in order to share them with other individuals. ROGER: My point is that I think you will run into troubles building a coherent metaphysics where either meaning or language is primarily intellectual (again, ICBW) As said, IMO language is social, so no problem. About meaning, hope it's clear what I'm.... meaning. tks for your patience (and sorry again) Marco MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/ MD Queries - [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at: http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
