MDers, especially Struan and Bodvar,

I think laughter is a possible example of something Pirsig would claim an 
SOMist would believe is unreal, but perhaps the more internalized, 
generalized concept of humour is a better example. Bodvar, you said that 
laughter as expression is subjective, but it's just as objective as the 
facial expressions accompanying laughter. One is sound and the other is 
sight; both can be objectively verified by people and recorded by 
instruments.

The cause of laughter is what's truly subjective. This is humour, of 
course. If Struan were to ask his students if humour was real, he may get 
mixed results. A negative answer I think has more to do with the 
definition of reality than anything else, because there is a definite 
prejudice toward reality as meaning "objective reality". I suspect though, 
that a careful student of philosophy will ask what is meant by reality in 
this case, because there is a strong urge, even among westerners, to want 
to answer the question affirmatively, given that there is a widely held 
concensus that humour is similarly experienced by people in every 
culture. It sure seems to exist, despite science not knowing what it 
really is.

Humour is a kind of quality, an SOM fringe term as Pirsig would put it. 
Pirsig would almost certainly say that humour is not real according to SOM.

But if you ask this question (about the reality of humour) of less 
educated people, people who haven't learned the subtle prejudicial 
meanings of "real" and "exists", who don't think they are being asked a 
philosophical question and don't worry whether the question might be a 
trick question, you will always get a response of "Sure!", along with a 
big smile and maybe a laugh (probably cos they think they're being tricked
afterall or because they think the questioner isn't the brightest bulb on 
the tree).

So what is SOM, according to Pirsig? As far as I can tell, it comes in 
three flavors.

1) When Pirsig says that everything, according to SOM, is either a subject 
or an object, he sometimes takes this to mean only substance. For some 
arguments he can get away with this, and he uses this definition wherever 
he can, because it makes the current metaphysics seem the most extreme and 
ridiculous.

2) When he can't do this, he makes SOM define reality to include only what 
science has blessed as real. It's this definition of SOM Pirsig usually 
adheres to. So for example, even though gravity is neither subject nor 
object (substance), the subject/object metaphysics says it's real because 
science says so. He also takes the approach that if science hasn't weighed 
in on a subject, even if it's a subject science has no business speaking 
about, then the subject is not real. Also, depending on the argument he's 
making, what constitutes science varies. Sometimes it's limited to physics.
Sometimes it includes anthropology. Sometimes he equates being scientific
with simply being rational or objective.

3) But even this doesn't suffice to cover it. Sometimes SOM refers to the 
subjective/objective split, the belief that a thing is either one or the 
other and the twain shall never meet. In this version of SOM, you believe 
that subjective things are real, perhaps more so, than objective things, 
but you are forever saddled with the vexing mind/body problem and the 
inevitable slippage into solipsism, which even dualists find distasteful. 
Pirsig is a recovering SOMist of this flavor, and is not too critical of 
it, even though he suffered mental illness struggling over its
consequences.

So SOM is a hodgepodge of things. I spoke about my confusion of it in a 
post in the MF during the month SOM was discussed as a strawman. I
certainly agree with Struan that SOM is a strawman. I think the current 
western metaphysical belief system is not captured accurately by SOM. 1 
and 2 are too narrow and 3 is clearly a minority position (except in this 
forum). The closest representation lies somewhere between flavors 2 and 3. 
My opinion is that western culture could stand being nudged toward 3 a 
little bit more, to the extent that nearly all philosophy students would 
agree that humour is real.

What is also troubling is that I think SOM is intentionally 
misrepresented, and so in this I also agree with Struan. I think this 
because Pirsig is too smart to make such errors and because he identifies 
with the Sophists and their methods of rhetoric.

For those who observe,
Merry Christmas.

Glenn
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