Hi Glenn:
GLENN:
You do not have any empirical knowledge, radical or otherwise, that
electrons and atoms in the nervous system or anywhere else are
experiential. If this is what MOQ subscribes to then it contradicts itself.
You do not have any empirical knowledge that I am �experiential� other
than my behavior. Some smart people have deduced that particles,
atoms, molecules, amoebas, etc. are experiential based on their
behavior, among them Konrad Lorenz who wrote: �If one observes an
amoeba in its natural habitat one would not hesitate to attribute to it the
power of subjective experience. What the organism learns about its
environment can be expressed in the simple phrase, �It�s better here�
or �It�s not so good here.�� Bertrand Russell has opined: �So far as
quantum theory can say at present, atoms might as well be
possessed of free will, limited however to one of several possible
choices." Pirsig, citing quantum physics, says �Particles �prefer� to do
what they do.�
GLENN:
Panexperientialism is a conjecture probably inspired by the fallacy of
division, which states that a property of something (consciousness of
humans) must apply to its parts (electrons and atoms), followed by the
fallacy of composition, which states that a property of parts
(consciousness of protons and atoms) also applies to the whole
(viruses or amoebas).
Reductionism is a conjecture . . . I can say the same fallacies inspired
science, except of course for those miraculous �emergents� and
�epiphenomenons.�
GLENN:
This raises another problem for the MOQ. Because now we have Pirsig
believing that humans participate in the creation of "all" things *and*
believing in panexperientialism. If sub-atomic particles can experience
DQ, then sub-atomic particles can participate in the creation of rocks.
So now there are two ways rocks can be created, and for a
metaphysics to be clear, it should explain how to differentiate a rock
that is created by one method or the other.
You are welcome to your view and pardon me for not noticing. I thought
otherwise because you defended Pirsig's ZMM statement that included
humans in the creation equation. However, since panexperientialism
also includes humans, I get the impression this still leaves open your
saying some day that humans participate in the creation of all things,
like rocks...
Some learned opinion has concluded that without observation there
are no rocks, no reality. DQ is the �observer� part of the equation. As
such, it is the foundation of all things, replacing the concept of �energy�
that is claimed by physical science to be the foundation of all things.
(Being of scientific mind, you might want to explain to the group what
energy is, where it came from and how it creates everything.)
PLATT: (previously)
In the hot stove scenario, the low value experienced by the electrons
which are disturbed by the radiant heat of the hot stove is transferred to
nerve tissue cells which experience low value and pass their
experience up through the nervous system to the synapses of the brain
which experience the low value and send a signal to the heated area to
remove itself from the low value situation. All this internal goings on
you subconsciously experience as low value and you react to it by
getting your ass off the hot stove before you can exclaim �Ouch!�
GLENN:
OK. Here (I think) you put the "low value" before the substance in every
sub-event leading up to the feeling of pain and well before the "ouch!",
thus keeping DQ primary for every sub-event. So for the hot stove event
taken as a whole, we have a constant interleaving of biological and DQ
events that must cross over between physical space and some other
unknown �space" inhabited by DQ. While I almost always hesitate to
employ Occam's Razor, this time it seems appropriate.
If what you say is true, then DQ is very busy keeping track of every
electron in the universe (not to mention all other static quality), deciding
the context in which it exists and doling out value to each on a moment
by moment basis. For example, DQ has to decide whether to have
each electron experience low-value just before it is disturbed by a
certain amount of heat (as is the case when the electron exists inside
a human sitting on a hot stove) or to experience high-value just before
it is disturbed by a certain amount of heat (as is the case when the
electron exists inside the sun or inside bacteria that live near under-
sea volcanic vents). Of course all this is possible in theory, but the
inefficiency of it strains belief.
Getting back to the stove, it seems much more likely that the electrons,
being in an excited state, act *themselves* as signals to the nerve
tissue in your skin, in which case the addition of a low-value
experience is superfluous. Not only does this give the electrons a
purpose (in your version they didn't seem to have one), but this is what
we see empirically.
Electrons with a �purpose? Purposeful behavior indicates something
�experiential,� i.e., awareness, DQ. Your argument admits to what it
attempts to disprove. As for Occam�s Razor, let�s see how it applies to
the �energy-is-all� explanation of creation that I invite you to present to
us.
.� PIRSIG:
...From the cells' point of view sex is pure Dynamic Quality, the highest
Good of all.� (LILA, Chap. 15)
PLATT:
Pay particular attention to the phrases, �pure quality for the cells,� and
�From the cell�s point of view sex is pure DQ.� How many biologists do
you suppose would say in a speech to their colleagues, �The cell is
acting this way because it knows what it likes and from its point of view
its doing what it thinks is the most moral thing to do.� Not many, I
wager. And that�s because biologists can�t measure a cell�s point of
view or what it feels like to be a cell any more than they can measure
yours or mine or what we�re feeling at this moment.
GLENN:
Agreed. I guess you and Pirsig *do* know what it feels like to be a cell,
for except as some rhetorical device I do not know what else could
account for the certitude of your prose.
The certitude(such as it is) can be accounted for by the explanatory
power of the MOQ as whole.
PLATT:
Materialists don�t have a mind/matter problem? That�s a laugh.
There�s a whole group of scientists down in Santa Fe headed by
physicist Murray Gellman who are trying to solve the mind/matter
problem. David Chalmers who has been studying this question for
years and is recognized by the scientific community as preeminent in
the field has concluded that subjective consciousness continues to
defy all objectivist explanations. �Toward this end, I propose that
conscious experience be considered a fundamental feature,
irreducible to anything more basic. The idea may seem strange at first,
but consistency seems to demand it.�
GLENN:
You are referring to the group that is mainly studying chaos, not the
mind/matter problem. David Chalmers may be a scientist but he
doesn't sound like much of a materialist. I'd be interested to know why
he thinks "consistency seems to demand it".
The purpose of the Sante Fe Institute is broad enough to include both
chaos and the mind/matter problem. From it�s Web page, the following
�purpose� statement: �Operating as a small, visiting institution, SFI
seeks to catalyze new collaborative, multidisciplinary projects that
break down the barriers between the traditional disciplines, to spread
its ideas and methodologies to other individuals and encourage the
practical applications of its results.� You can find out about why David
Chalmers thinks as he does by going to his home page on the Web.
He identifies himself as a philosopher but has a background in
mathematics and cognitive science which is why I mistakenly called
him a scientist. Correct my if I�m wrong, but no scientist has come up
with a creditable theory to explain how mind emerged from no mind.
PLATT:
None of the theories of science are science. The philosophical
premise of science that only propositions that can be empirically
verified are true cannot be empirically verified. Mathematics and logic
on which science is built cannot be verified by pointing a finger at them.
The Schrodinger equation you refer to is �concept.� Observations are
also �concepts� when intellectualized. You seem to work hard to keep
anything �mental� or �conceptual� out of science, an impossibility of
course.
GLENN: What do you mean? I'm merely pointing out that the
Copenhagen interpretation is more philosophy than science. That's
why it's called an interpretation, not a theory. The CI is speculation that
cannot be tested by the scientific method. You're saying science claims
propositions (like DQ or CI) cannot be true because it doesn't lend
itself to the scientific method. Science does not say this. CI may be
true, it's just that its truth is in doubt. I only brought this up because you
said CI is "according to science", when it's more precise to say CI is
"an interpretation of a scientific theory". When we're lazy, or when
precise distinctions are not important, we use 'science' as an umbrella
term for things in and around science, but I don't think we should in
discussions like these.
Under your definition of speculation, the scientific method is
speculative because it cannot be tested by the scientific method and
therefore it�s truth is in doubt.
GLENN:
Also, this business about turning the scientific method on itself and
showing it is fundamentally flawed is unfair. You're trumping up
science to be a metaphysics and it doesn't claim to be. It's the SOM
strawman again. The scientific method only applies to phenomena,
and the scientific method is not a phenomena. The MOQ, which truly is
a metaphysics, does attempt to cover more than science, but this
should be no surprise once you're clear about what science is. You are
either still not clear on this, or your misrepresentations are intentional.
You use the same rhetorical tricks as Pirsig. You're no different. You
say you admire science and then you pull these stunts.
Not stunts. Legitimate inquiry. You say the scientific method is not a
phenomena. Are not methods phenomena? Are not concepts
phenomena? Does the scientific method somehow transcend
phenomena, existing in some otherworldly realm like Plato�s Ideals?
Further, you claim that science isn�t a metaphysics, i.e., not �concerned
with existence, causality, truth, etc.� (my dictionary�s definition of
metaphysics). That will certainly come as news to many.
GLENN:
Platt, in past discussions with you we've had disagreements but
they've always been grounded in a world-view we could sensibly
discuss. In fact, that's why I enjoy talking to you. But in this post you've
retreated to a world-view that is extremely speculative and somewhat
bizarre.
I suspect that "the normally sensible Platt" has been driven to such
excesses in order to argue his way through a contradiction in the MOQ
illustrated by rock creation.
Oh, oh. Up to now we�ve had lively debates without taking personal
swipes at one another. If that is what I�ve driven you to, it�s time to break
off the discussion. If you�re happy with the �oops� explanation of
creation, so be it. I certainly do not wish my arguments to cause you
any unpleasantness.
Platt
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