Hi Ham Thanks for reply. May I suggest that a Pirsigian (I like this name it sounds like we come from some alien planet in a 1950s sci-fi movie) would say that the idea/concept of substance is a useful one in certain contexts to refer to certain common aspects of things (another idea/concept) such as occupying space, having mass, lower level patterns that play a role in the emergence of higher level patterns, the different patterns of atoms/elements, etc. However, prior to the construction of such ideas/concepts, a Pirsigian would want to know how we came up with these ideas, how do they relate to experience? For a Pirsigian the starting point of analysis has to be what we experience, what are the qualities upon which we are trying to constuct these concepts/ideas, and what value do these qualities have, and what is the relationship between the static and dynamic in this complex of idea-concepts? For us, the concept 'substance' seems too loaded with reductive assumptions, and does not embrace our ontological pluralism. Of course we also recognise something that unifies reality, that all reality consists of qualities, and that qualities are always a matter of significance, we do not just observe qualities, we are always aware of qualities in a scheme of values, they always lie on a value-spectrum between horror and subliminity, we do not observe the world from some safe distance, we are are in dynamic interaction trying to realise best potential we have.
Regards David M ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ham Priday" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[email protected]> Sent: Sunday, January 28, 2007 5:27 AM Subject: Re: [MD] Dawkins a Materialist (is watching?] > On 1/27 David Morey asked: > >> Ham >> >> What does 'substance' mean to you? > > I knew there had to be a logical reason behind this question, and I found > it > by consulting my dictionary. (Probably what you had expected me to do -- > if > not your true motive.) > > Yes, David, Webster's New Collegiate does cite "essence; essential nature" > as synonyms for "substance". But, since you asked for my meaning, I'd go > with Webster's third definition: "physical material from which something > is > made or which has discrete existence." But I also checked the Free Online > Dictionary, and like both of their definitions: "a. That which has mass > and > occupies space; matter. b. A material of a particular kind or > constitution." > > It isn't surprising that Aristotle didn't differentiate between > "substance" > and "essence", as they were the same to him; the substance of a thing WAS > its essence. And Aristotelian ontology has carried over into scientific > objectivism. But for the essentialist, there is only ONE Essence; and > once > something is delimited, identified and defined as "having discrete > existence" [i.e., beingness], the most appropriate term is 'substance'. > For > the general mode of experiential "existence" I would probably tend to use > 'matter' and 'beingness' synonomously. That's because I define existence > as > the experience of "that which occupies space" and occurs in time. > > Now may I return the question, and ask how a Pirsigian would define > 'substance'? (You may consider my motive to be the same as yours.) > > Thank you, David. > > Essentially yours, > Ham > > moq_discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > moq_discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
