Brilliant Arlo, truly awesome synthesis ... BTW, your "productivity" has been immense these last couple of months .... what trip are you on ? Let us in on it. What's your main project in life at the moment ?
I may share the aims, but I can only stand in awe of your output. Ian On 1/29/07, Arlo Bensinger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > [Ian] > One reason I latched onto the Johnson quote you > brought up (or was it Arlo) is because Lakoff & > Johnson's "Metaphors We Live By" and "Fire, Women > and Dangerous Things" made a big impression on me. > > [Arlo] > Just adding the following to support our position. > > Mark Johnson, in his introduction to his edited > volume "Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor", > describes something I think should resonate > (perhaps uncoincidentally) strongly with those > familiar with Pirsig's expostion on the sophists. > > "Early on, metaphor flourished in myth and > poetry. It was natural for the pre-Socratic > philosophers to feel at home with the mythic > modes of their predecessors and to utilize > figurative language to express their insights. > Indeed, their philosophic fragments constitute > one vast network of interrelated metaphors - and > to make sense of their thought is, above all, to unpack these metaphors. > > It is one of the ironies of history that Plato > (428/27-348/47 B.C.), the master of metaphor, > having left no explicit treatment of his primary > art, should have been taken as providing that > basis for the traditional suspicion of metaphor. > That alleged bias is his discussion of the "old > quarrel between philosophy and poetry" (Republic, > X, 607b). Plato defends the banishment of > philosophically uneducated imitive poets on two > grounds: (1) These poets have no genuine > knowledge of that which they imitate - they > produce imitations of imitations of the real and > are thus "three removes from the king and the > truth as are all other imitators" (Republic, X, > 597e). (2) Poetry "feeds and waters the passions, > instead of drying them up; she let's them rule > instead of ruling them as they ought to be ruled, > with a view to the happiness and virtue of mankind" (Republic, X, 606d). > > Plato's expulsion of the imitative poets must > not, of course, be read as a condemnation of > figurative language per se. But it does show his > awareness of the power of metaphor and myth to > influence conviction, and it reveals his fear of > their potential for misuse. This vulnerability to > abuse seems to be the reason for his claim that > the poet, "knowing nothing but how to imitate, > lays on with words and phrases the colors of the > several arts in such fashion that other equally > ignorant men, who see things only through words, > will deem his words most excellent..." (Republic, > X, 601a). It is on similar grounds that he > criticizes sophists who care nothing for the > truth and who "make trifles seem important and > important points trifles by the force of their language" (Phaedrus, 267a-b). > > Plato's attack is directed against the poet of > sophist whose misuse of language leads others > away from truth. The irony here, to repeat, is > that his criticique of imitative poetry has often > been read as applying to metaphor generally, > despite his supreme use of metaphor to convey his > most important philosophical convictions." (Johnson, 1981). > > This mirrors the discussion held in ZMM. > Importantly, I would draw your attention to this > passage. "Phædrus reads further and further into > pre-Socratic Greek thought to find out, and > eventually comes to the view that Plato's hatred > of the rhetoricians was part of a much larger > struggle in which the reality of the Good, > represented by the Sophists, and the reality of > the True, represented by the dialecticians, were > engaged in a huge struggle for the future mind of > man. Truth won, the Good lost, and that is why > today we have so little difficulty accepting the > reality of truth and so much difficulty accepting > the reality of Quality, even though there is no > more agreement in one area than in the other." > > Jumping ahead slightly, Pirsig writes, "They were > teachers, but what they sought to teach was not > principles, but beliefs of men. Their object was > not any single absolute truth, but the > improvement of men. All principles, all truths, > are relative, they said. "Man is the measure of > all things." These were the famous teachers of > "wisdom," the Sophists of ancient Greece." > > How does this insight, advancing the > "metaphoricity" of all things, relate to Quality? > "And yet, Phædrus understands, what he is saying > about Quality is somehow opposed to all this. It > seems to agree much more closely with the > Sophists. "Man is the measure of all things." > Yes, that's what he is saying about Quality. Man > is not the source of all things, as the > subjective idealists would say. Nor is he the > passive observer of all things, as the objective > idealists and materialists would say. The Quality > which creates the world emerges as a relationship > between man and his experience. He is a > participant in the creation of all things. The > measure of all things...it fits." > > Pirsig has two passages that relate to the > fallout from this shift from "metaphoricity" to > "Absolute Truth". The first comes shortly after > Phaedrus realizes the "encapsulation" of the > sophists "metaphoricity" into a system of > "Absolute". Pirsig writes, "And the bones of the > Sophists long ago turned to dust and what they > said turned to dust with them and the dust was > buried under the rubble of declining Athens > through its fall and Macedonia through its > decline and fall. Through the decline and death > of ancient Rome and Byzantium and the Ottoman > Empire and the modern states...buried so deep and > with such ceremoniousness and such unction and > such evil that only a madman centuries later > could discover the clues needed to uncover them, > and see with horror what had been done...." > > The modern fallout of this, Pirsig describes as > such. "And now he began to see for the first time > the unbelievable magnitude of what man, when he > gained power to understand and rule the world in > terms of dialectic truths, had lost. He had built > empires of scientific capability to manipulate > the phenomena of nature into enormous > manifestations of his own dreams of power and > wealth...but for this he had exchanged an empire > of understanding of equal magnitude: an > understanding of what it is to be a part of the world, and not an enemy of > it." > > "Metaphoricity" and an understanding that > "relative" does NOT imply subjectivity nor > objectivity but an active, participatory role in the emergence of Quality. > > Mark Johnson, also in his introduction mentioned > above, describes a similar stance taken by > adherents of metaphor. "In general, > [irreducibility theorists] must hold that we > encounter our world, not passively, but by means > of projective acts influenced by our interests, > purposes, values, beliefs, and language. Because > our world is an imaginative, value-laden > construction, metaphors that alter our conceptual > structure (themselves carried by older metaphors) > will also alter the way we experience things." > > In this last Johnson post, I think one can > clearly overlay Pirsig's description of the > mythos and, even more directly, the "figure sorting sand" passage. > > This "active, participatory role" of wo/man in > the creation of meaning (and its subsequent > adherence to metaphoricity) is also addressed by > David Granger in his book on Pirsig and Dewey. > > "In light of the above, we will henceforth adhere > to Dewey's regular practice of speaking of > knowledge in terms of "knowledge relations" or > the process of "coming-to-know." This will remind > us that knowledge, for Dewey and Pirsig, exists > neither in a static state nor as an > individualistic possession of some sort. For the > Cartesian thinker, to the contrary, the move to > such an active, situation-based conception of > knowledge flies in the face of the quest for > certainty: It deprives us of the so-called > Archimedean point, the absolute perspective from > which to behold the world and its contents. > > All the same, this quest holds no place on > Dewey's and Pirsig's philosophical agendas. As > they see it, uncertainty must be accepted at the > end of the day as an indelible part of the human > condition in a world such as ours. "Absolute > certainty in knowledge of things and absolute > security in the ordering of life" are to them no > more than chimeras, and, to the extent that their > pursuit pulls us away from the dynamic everyday > world of people and things, potentially > destructive (LW 1: 373; see also ZMM264). If > Experience and Nature left us with any doubt as > to Dewey's position here, a succeeding volume, > his now-classic The Quest for Certainty (1929), > made it emphatically clear. Aided by the work of > twentieth-century physicist Warner Heisenberg, > whose ground-breaking research had appeared only > two years earlier, Dewey tried once and for all > to close the book on spectator theories of knowledge." (Granger, pp. 60-61) > > "Or as Heisenberg puts it, "what we observe is > not nature in itself but nature exposed to our > questioning."19 This means that there is no way > for an inquirer to remain a detached spectator. > The knower is continuuous with what is finally > known, an active participant in the ongoing drama > of an unfinished world (LW 4: 163)." (Granger, p.62) > > Granger as well refers to this passage from > Pirsig, quoted below from LILA, which I'll end with. > > "Unlike subject-object metaphysics the > Metaphysics of Quality does not insist on a > single exclusive truth. If subjects and objects > are held to be the ultimate reality then we're > permitted only one construction of things - that > which corresponds to the "objective" world-and > all other constructions are unreal. But if > Quality or excellence is seen as the ultimate > reality then it becomes possible for more than > one set of truths to exist. Then one doesn't seek > the absolute "Truth." One seeks instead > the highest quality intellectual explanation of > things with the knowledge that if the past is any > guide to the future this explanation must be > taken provisionally; as useful until something > better comes along. One can then examine > intellectual realities the same way he examines > paintings in an art gallery, not with an effort > to find out which one is the "real" painting, but > simply to enjoy and keep those that are of value. > There are many sets of intellectual reality in > existence and we can perceive some to have more > quality than others, but that we do so is, in > part, the result of our history and current patterns of values." > > moq_discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > moq_discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
