[matt] >From little to no understanding of what Peirce, or you, exactly mean by "theory of meaning," I would probably agree that Pirsig's system yields just that--insofar as we agree with Donald Davidson that a theory of meaning is also a theory of truth which are two ways of saying a theory about the way the world works, which is to say whatever suggestions that _work_ about the way the world works--which is to say, whatever ways we find ourselves successfully making our way about the world counts as a theory of meaning. I think saying it's a "theory" sounds a little pretentious (and Platonic), but that's just me.
Matt Matt, I used the term "theory of meaning" to come close to what I think Peirce was getting at like "philosophology" I guess A "study" of meaning might be more like it. Peirce was a polymath and damn hard to read because he wrote using mathmatical Terms and was more on the wittenstien side of the coin , what your last comment said to me is almost exactly how I took james work And more than likely I did misinterpret his meaning. It just seemed Peirce was on the same trail as Pirsig in questioning The edifice of scientific method and knowledge. Thanks, I'm going to go digging on this and get back to you in a few days with something more concrete to discuss. Then I can argue a relavent point a little better. -x -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Matt Kundert Sent: Tuesday, February 13, 2007 8:59 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [MD] Pirsig, James and Peirce x, I'm not sure I understand your reading of Pirsig/Peirce, but I think one thing that would help in our appreciation of James (and Rorty's appropriation) is reading the full line from which people attribute "truth is whatever works" to James, usually because Rorty I think did write such a shocking sentence as a gloss on pragmatism. "The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons." If we suspend our disbelief at Rorty's audacity, I think it is readily apparent that Rorty is glossing, and accepting fully, James's version, which isn't as unseemly as it might at first appear. The thing we need to see is that what "works" does so, not willy-nilly, but "for definite, assignable reasons." That's where the argument occurs, that's where people have to fight and enter into the community of inquirers that marks the border between flighty opinion and rational knowledge. Definite, assignable reasons. Not _any_ reason will do, but reasons that convince people, reasons that have arguments, evidence, etc., etc. An assertion that "works" is, therefore, not such an easy thing to get. You have to really _work_ for it, like scientific theories: some live, some die--they are worked for to see if they are true. >From little to no understanding of what Peirce, or you, exactly mean by "theory of meaning," I would probably agree that Pirsig's system yields just that--insofar as we agree with Donald Davidson that a theory of meaning is also a theory of truth which are two ways of saying a theory about the way the world works, which is to say whatever suggestions that _work_ about the way the world works--which is to say, whatever ways we find ourselves successfully making our way about the world counts as a theory of meaning. I think saying it's a "theory" sounds a little pretentious (and Platonic), but that's just me. Matt _________________________________________________________________ Search for grocery stores. Find gratitude. Turn a simple search into something more. http://click4thecause.live.com/search/charity/default.aspx?source=hmemta gline_gratitude&FORM=WLMTAG moq_discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ moq_discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
