Rick, Hugo, Rick wrote: "I believe the quotes previously presented support the notion that Pirsig sees static/dynamic as only one possible metaphysical division of Quality. This would suggest that he does see "Quality" as more primary that DQ and SQ (if other divisions of Q are possible, than how could it not be 'more primary' than one particular split?). This is not to suggest a trinity, rather I think he's suggesting that static/dynamic (or any other metaphysical division like romantic/classic, subject/object) only exist as concepts within human understanding; Intellectually adequate, but ultimately incomplete descriptions of Quality, the undivided reality that exists prior to and could never fully be contained within any human understanding. But I hope we can discuss this some more as I believe Pirsig's writings on the subject certainly warrant further exploration."
One could argue that SOM is a metaphysics (albeit one that no one completely believes), yet it makes little sense to call SOM a Quality metaphysics unless the constituents of its first cut are kinds of Quality, and this would only happen if you were convinced that subjects and objects are not really subjects and objects but instead kinds of Quality. In short, saying that SOM or any metaphysics you can think of is really a Quality metaphysics in disguise is less an insight than it is a demonstration of the extent of Pirsig's bias. Pirsig says in LC that "ideas come first" except for DQ, which exists prior to ideas. So if this is true then how could Pirsig also think that the Dynamic part of static/dynamic Quality *only* exists as a concept within human understanding? Admittedly, there is a certain difficulty about using terms like Quality, Dynamic Quality, and static quality and being completely understood because they serve dual functions as ideas in and of themselves and as pointers to other aspects of reality, but since ideas and reality are so intimately intertwined in the MoQ, as they are in any metaphysics based on philosophical idealism, it is often impossible to set straight the system's interior logic. Hugo dug up the ch. 9 quote: "In the past Phaedrus's own radical bias caused him to think of Dynamic Quality alone and neglect static patterns of quality." His own radical bias makes him forget about static quality many times after the first 40 chapters. Check out how he throws around the term quality when he is clearly speaking of DQ in his 2000 letter to Bodvar. http://www.moq.org/forum/Pirsig/letter2.html Hugo: "Has anyone noticed that each book contains 32 chapters? Put together is 64, just the number of hexagrams in the I Ching. Coincidence?" Oh for goodness sake. Hugo: "Does his explanation help us understand mystical reality? As much as a description of the colour red help us "see" the colour red. "taste" guacamole (Did I tell you I am Mexican?), "smell" roses, "feel" a baby's skin, "hear" Mozart... mystical reality is there to be experienced, not to be explained." I think if you accept these examples, as well as Pirsig's metaphor about the menu and the food, as mystical, then Pirsig has done an adequate job of helping us understand the mystical in juxtaposition to metaphysics. Hugo: "I would equate the MOQ with a ZEN philosophy for the XX-XXI century western thinkers. It enables you to talk about reality in metaphysical terms without the risk of being mocked and turned down as "new ager" or just "mystical", "unscientific", "illogical", etc." Certain detractors of the MoQ, including myself, have been saying these very things for a long time. For example, see the title of the review of Lila's Child by Struan Hellier at amazon.com, and the first few sentences of the second paragraph. Glenn MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_focus/ MF Queries - [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from moq_focus follow the instructions at: http://www.moq.org/mf/subscribe.html
