Wow, an entire web site devoted to ZAMM and Lila. I'm quite impressed, not to mention overjoyed. I've always thought there should be a forum where we Pirsig fans could discuss the MOQ and such. I just didn't know that one already existed. Well, here are some of my thoughts on the question: "The subject-object metaphysics (SOM) that seems to attract so much blame is also described as, 'a straw man, a position held by no-one'. Who exactly does hold a purely SOM position? Who completely denies the existence of Quality? If nobody, or very few people, who or what are we criticizing?" There is no such thing as a "subject-object metaphysics" per se. What Pirsig is referring to, of course, is the traditional division between mind and matter that has dominated philosophy since the time of Descartes. The underlying questions of all metaphysics are "what things exist?" and "what is the nature of those things that exist?" Descartes held that both mind and matter exist and that the existence of each is independent of the other. There are, therefore, two things that exist. I suppose that this would be a "purely SOM position." However, this is certainly isn't the only possibility, and in fact, not many philosophers today hold to a duelist metaphysics. Occam's razor (and common sense) seems to dictate that it's more likely that the universe is only composed of one "thing". The materialists, then, say that it's matter (and that mind is created by matter), and the idealists say that it's mind (and that matter is created by mind). Strictly speaking, however, these paradigms are still assuming the mind-matter split. Pirsig's metaphysics, on the other hand, claims that there is a more basic "thing" out of which both mind and matter arise. It's this "pure experience" that he calls Quality. Interestingly enough, as I'm sure Pirsig is the first to admit, this is not exactly an original position. As we all know, William James was probably the first to introduce the idea with his radical empiricism. As you may not know, however, Bertrand Russell (one of the founders of the logical positivist school surprisingly enough) also held such a view, dubbing it neutral monism. In some ways, SOM is a straw man. Pirsig never explains exactly what he means by it, and he treats it as some sort of monolithic beast on which there is near universal agreement within the philosophical community and to which MOQ represents a dichotomous alternative. This, of course, is a rhetorical technique that he uses quite effectively, and I wouldn't criticize him too harshly for it. His point remains that in traditional philosophy, mind and/or matter are the most basic things possible. One is possibly reducible to the other, but they aren't reducible to anything else. What James, Russell, and Pirsig all maintain is that they are in fact reducible to something else, and this something else is "pure experience". This answers the first question of metaphysics: "what things exist?" Pirsig then goes in Lila where neither James nor Russell had tread. He address the second question: "what is the nature of those things that exist?" Going back to the original questions, then, it's fair to say that an overwhelming majority of philosophers (and non-philosophers for that matter) hold to some form of SOM (although we must understand that this is a very loose term). Similarly, the same overwhelming majority denies the existence of Quality (that is to say, they deny that there is something that is more basic than either mind or matter). However, from a certain standpoint, no one in there right mind truly denies the existence of Quality. You would be hard pressed to find someone who won't admit that some things are better than other things. Value judgments, that is, clearly exist. But they are hard to explain in traditional metaphysics. On the other hand, they are perfectly explainable in MOQ. They're everything! And they explain such basic questions as why life exists and how human society is possible. Even the most basic question of all, why does anything exist at all, is answered. This, I believe, is where the main strength of Pirsig's argument lies. Science can explain how the world works, but it can't explain why. MOQ can. MOQ.org - http://www.moq.org
