Frank,

I think the Policy is good, except for one comment on
the Risk, which I've responded more towards the FAQ
entry, here:

http://www.hecker.org/mozilla/certificate-faq/policy-details/

> In particular, we will evaluate whether or not a CA
> operates in a manner likely to cause undue risk for
> Mozilla users.


Risk is a very tricky thing to assess. Firstly, risk cannot be assessed without proper attention to the value at risk, and the threats against that value.

Secondly, by assessing the risk, however so done, and
then presenting the results for others to rely upon,
liability is created.  This liability is perhaps
limited by the price paid by the user ($0) but is
none-the-less present and available for some smart
lawyer to exploit.

One way to overcome this would be to deny any risk-based
assessment (a "common carrier" approach) but this would
then leave Mozilla users at the mercy of costless attacks
that the PKI permits.  Another way would be to ask for
the CAs to provide an indemnity;  this however is unlikely,
as their own businesses are constructed to reduce their
risks, not increase them.

A better way may be to reflect those risk assessments
back to those that carry the losses - the users.

This could be done by opening up a forum for every new
CA proposal.  (Actually, it could be done for all old
ones as well).  Just like the current CACert bug that
started this thread, each CA could have an ongoing
forum for user comment.

In this way, users can comment on the information
published, and they can present their findings.  This
would mean real scrutiny would now be possible, as
it is likely that Mozilla users have more resources
than the Mozilla Foundation.

Most users would never look at the practices of a CPA,
as a) they have not the time nor patience, or b) there
is nowhere to place their comments and assessments even
if they had the time.  However, if there was a defined
forum for comment, it could be hoped that sufficient
close Mozilla users would do sufficient analysis on
the major CAs such that the Mozilla Foundation could
simply refer to the sentiment on the forums.

Thus, they would outsource the risk assessment.  As
policy, this would also remove the liability.


Note 1: the original CACert bug, in a near perfect forum: <http://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215243> Note 2: this form of open governance is practiced in the gold issuance community, where lack of regulators means that the users have to protect themselves by demanding certain measures of issuers.



One other minor comment:

> We may elect to publish submitted information for use
> by Mozilla users and others; please note any information
> which you consider to be proprietary and not for public
> release.

This opens up a bait and switch.  Secret information
may be provided to Mozilla that will be supressed and
unavailable to the public.  In the event of a dispute,
this information may be relevent to the public party,
but will be unknown to them.  I'd recommend that all
information provided be deemed public, non-proprietary,
and publishable by Mozilla.

iang

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