Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >Indeed. Establish facts, and build on them. Sadly, >we have very little experience of signing weapons >being used under fire. Things like the PGP family's >fairly sophisticated web of trust have not really ever >been attacked, and neither has my own contract >signing technology.
>Attacks always filter to the most economical attack. >That's why for example, the great gaping hole of >the substitute CA attack is unexploited; it's cheaper >to simply bypass any crypto tech if the core app >does not force the use of crypto. Yup (see my other post in this thread). Signing has never been seriously attacked because it's so much easier to exploit a dozen other holes, and until those are fixed it's simply not worth devoting any more effort to signing. All it does is draw resources away from where they're needed most, addressing the other security holes. It's a bit like the German 600mm and 800mm guns during WWII, they were really cool toys and attracted all the attention, but overall they were a liability because (for example) in the battle for Sevastopol they drew resources *away* from the main battle where they were sorely needed. But hey, it's a cool toy, so we'll ignore the cost/benefit aspects and focus entirely on the coolness factor. Peter. _______________________________________________ mozilla-crypto mailing list [email protected] http://mail.mozilla.org/listinfo/mozilla-crypto
