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M. G. Stinnett,
thanks for your description of how the voting
mechanisms work to ensure integrity in our election system, but I still remain
concerned about the future.
You say:
I, myself, don't worry about the machine manufacturers trying
to write diabolical software to change votes. I've watched the testing, and it's
thorough--one city clerk I worked for delighted in coming up with new ways to
try to bollix the machines in testing.
Plus, all it would take is one minor scandal, and that manufacturer would be dead, dead, dead. They like selling their machines. They want to sell more. There's no way they would take such a chance for such a small gain (what good would it do Diebold to change election results in the Topeka, KS school board race?) when getting caught would kill the company (and the profits). What matters more than anything else, IMHO, is honest, dedicated judges. Minnesota has a wonderful system which requires at least two judges, from different parties, to work side-by-side on every vote-affecting decision. It works. My reply:
I fear, with the possible future use of paper-less DRE
machines, that the best intentions of dedicated judges and election officials
will have no bearing in preventing or clearing
up voting inaccuracies - accidental or fraudulent - if there isn't a
paper trail to fall back on. I liken it to the use of ATM machines:
Would anyone want to use an ATM machine that does not
provide a paper receipt of the transaction?
There are several reports now of suspicious election
outcomes nationwide (see links in my original report), the corruption of
which is not easily provable. Election fraud occurs now with current
machines that do have paper trails, but at least the paper trail can be
used to prove fraud in the event of a recount (not always the case).
Machines without a paper trail would provide an even easier,
non-verifiable, means to tamper with votes.
Vote tampering aside, accidental voting inaccuracies occur
and, without a paper trail, there's no way to go back to get an official
count. Andrew Gumble's article http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/1013-01.htm highlights that aside from corruption, electronic voting machines can
simply go wrong and, without a paper trail, there would be no way to correct for
inaccuracies.
It's just logical to ask then: why, if paper trails
have always been a part of our voting system, would any new technology
NOT include a mechanism for a paper trail? Sadly, our country
has a history of excluding, limiting and manipulating the voting
public. Thus, with regard to confidence that the
voting machine vendors will provide secure and reliable machines, there is
reason to be suspicious, as Andrew Gumble points out in his article
article:
If much of the worry about vote-tampering is directed at
the Republicans, it is largely because the big three touch screen companies are
all big Republican donors, pouring hundreds of thousands of dollars into party
coffers in the past few years. The ownership issue is, of course, compounded by
the lack of transparency. Or, as Dr Mercuri puts it: "If the machines were
independently verifiable, who would give a crap who owns them?" As it is, fears
that US democracy is being hijacked by corporate interests are being fueled by
links between the big three and broader business interests, as well as extremist
organizations.
Why, in light of the Florida vote-tampering scandal, and the
corporate scandal laden Bush Administration, should I not worry about new
voting technologies pushed by the Bush administration (Diebold and ES&S are
on the preferred vendor list) and developed by Republican-donor corporations
and, furthermore, are shown to be hackable!
The voting machine vendors don't have to worry about not
selling their machines since the federal government is providing the cash to buy
them. The machines HAVE been found to be insecure and they are being purchased
at this moment, including by the State of Minnesota.
At the federal level, Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ) has proposed
the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 (HR 2239) to
require that all new voting technologies are both RELIABLE and VERIFIABLE
through a paper trail.
Fortunately, the optical-scan system in Hennepin County and
the State has been reliable and verifiable to date (to my knowledge).
However, as part of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), the whole State of
Minnesota may be moving toward the same DRE machines as many other (perhaps
most) states throughout the country within a few years.
I have just received and read the State HAVA plan.
It stipulates that any new voting technology meet the requirement
of an audit trail. That's good, however, it also says that: "To
permit a non-paper ballot direct recording electronic (DRE) voting system, the
legislature must approve language amending MN Statues, Chapter 206 and Minnesota
Rules, Chapter 8220". The State, it
appears, is anticipating the possibility, or at
least discussion, of the use of machines that do not produce a paper
trail.
According to the MN HAVA plan, the State will spend $40
to $50 million to implement a new voting system. It appears that $23
million of this total will be matching federal funds. The plan calls for
replacing ALL existing optical scanning machines with new DRE machines
throughout the state and developing a state-wide voter registration system,
another requirement of HAVA.
I don't know why Minnesota is considering a complete
overhaul of the state's voting system. Is it broken? It
seems that the plan will cost significant money in return for marginal gains in
improvements. The state Republican administration may go along with the federal impetus to implement the new
DRE machines (even without a paper trail mechansim) perhaps to take advantage of
HAVA funds or to acquiese to the federal
mandate. There's reason to be worried about this: the State of Minnesota
has ALREADY certified machines that do not produce a paper trail for the use on
an experimental bases DESPITE a requirement in their RFP to include this
function.
As the State moves forward in compliance with HAVA,
replacing our existing optical-scan technology with DRE
machines, we should remain vigilent and advocate to
stay with current Minnesota law requiring paper audit trails. According to David
Maeda, DRE machines that produce a paper trail are possible to design and
it's prudent that we make sure they do. Jeanne Massey
Kingfield
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