One of the matters that distinguishes .NET on the WindowsPhone vs .NET on the Intel platform or .NET Smartcard Platform is how the TPM integrity metrics shall be collected. This will affect how the muscle .NET applet is or is not loaded in a TPM-enabled .NET smartcard - whether the vendor must first be signed up to a VeriSign/Microsoft CA, fall under US law therefore, and whether there are integrity metrics in the cards TPM database, to distinguish managed applet from unmanaged applet code (which might leverage pre-issance native code - on .NET cards that are not native MSIL).
For Microsoft/Intel trusted computing to work on .NET smartcard platforms, as a voluntary option, there has to be an integrity metrics database - of all the software you are ever likely to want to put on your smartcard/PC/phone. One sees now why Microsoft will keep its PC/server paltform spyware program scanner free, so long as you populate the spynet database with constant updates, for the billions of software version/variants that exist.. Keeping out spyware is the inverse of collating the integrity verification database for the TPM veriifcation database to make Longhorn's opt-in TPM option, viable. Everything Ive ever learned about Microsoft pursaudes me TPM opt-in will be truely opt-ins; and they will go the extra trip around the world to make sure the "PC" stays the PC, not a instrument of control.
In the case of .NET smartcards with a supposed .NET muscle applet, or a smartphone similarly provisioned with the same kind of applet, its not clear how they will collect the TPM's applet or phone-applet intregrity metrics. The whole point of the integrity controls are, of course, the phone wont even boot, if you have made an unauthorized change to your hardware/software config, like install an unrecognized applet/program. But as phone and smartcard platforms converge with the PC/server platform, its not clear how third parties other than the phone companiues can manage the TPM database, and keep the phone's security configuration independent of the phone/data service provider.
Peter.
----- Original Message ----- From: "Anders Rundgren" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "MUSCLE" <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, February 27, 2005 1:05 PM
Subject: Re: [Muscle] .Net remoting channel, muscle://
Another, somewhat related thought experiment:
http://web.telia.com/~u18116613/TheUniversalAccessControlCard.pdf
Anders R
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