Hello, Peter:
 
Who signs all these certificates?  To what do they attest?  And why should I 
believe a word they have to say?
 
Cheers, Scott

        -----Original Message----- 
        From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Peter Tomlinson 
        Sent: Thu 8/11/2005 3:40 AM 
        To: MUSCLE 
        Cc: Henry Ryan 
        Subject: Re: [Muscle] Vendor keys in smart cards - How/where?
        
        

        As a natural consequence of work done under the eEurope Smart Cards
        umbrella, the following should be implemented:
        
        - secure the silicon chip at the wafer level, before it is sawn (inject
        a certificate into each individual cell that will eventually go into a
        smart card as soon as that cell is tested good)
        
        - secure the card OS with a certificate
        
        - secure the JavaCard interpreter with a certificate
        
        - secure each relevant on-card application (applet) with a certificate,
        including the structure into which data will be loaded.
        
        The eESC group was hoping to further develop security topics, but the EC
        refused further funding for a secretariat and a small number of editors.
        Short-sighted of them.
        
        (Anders: can you identify the security lists, please?)
        
        Peter
        
        Anders Rundgren wrote:
        
        > There has been several suggestions in various security lists that a
        > HW token during a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) should be able to
        > counter- sign the request with a key and cert identifying the
        > container itself.
        >
        > The reason for this is that certain CA policies require that the
        > users only have store (and use) keys in "strong cases".
        >
        > Pardon my ignorance, but is there any kind of standard practice for
        > deploying vendor keys?  Links would be higly appreciated.
        >
        > In addition I would like to know how one could handle such keys from
        > a PKCS #11 interface.
        >
        > thanx, Anders Rundgren
        > _______________________________________________ Muscle mailing list
        > [email protected]
        > http://lists.drizzle.com/mailman/listinfo/muscle
        >
        
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