On Mon, Apr 29, 2024 at 10:53:38PM +0200, Steffen Nurpmeso wrote: > Derek Martin wrote in > |> 1. https://github.com/autocrypt/protected-headers > |> 2. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-header-protection/ > | > |Neat. But this feature seems like a misfeature, making you > |immediately susceptible to MITM.
Hopefully it was clear from context that I was talking about Autocrypt, not header protection, despite botching the quoting. > I *wholeheartly* agree! S/MIME is so much better by concept! > This is why i like the new approach most PGP people now use, in > that they use a signed MIME multipart which includes the public > key as an attachment. But... no... This isn't better. In either case, the problem is that the source of the trust data--the e-mail itself--is untrusted. You have to have some way to verify the identity and signature of the key out of band. If you don't, you can guarantee that only the person who sent you the key can read what you write, but you can't guarantee the recipient is who you think it is. > For PGP there really should be better (ie: TXT-based; or like so) > SMIMEA/OPENPGKEY DNS entries, because what else one can have? > WKD, and HKPS. I (and many others) use OpenPGP: and point via > https:// --- which is totally absurd given that the entire HTTPS > aka TLS community as it is of today uses CA pools that is based > upon commercial supermans. No. The trust model that OpenPGP implements is actually quite good--it lets users establish the web of trust, and it also kind of lets you "rate" your trust of a key, and then you can use that to make a decision about how sensitive the info you're sending is, and whether or not the trust level you have of the key matches it. The problem is, in practice, hardly anyone uses encryption at all, and of those that do, too many use it improperly. Unfortunately, using encryption properly and effectively is rather unavoidably inconvenient--it requires thought and care. Surely that's why it has not been, and probably never will be, widely adopted. :( The kinds of solutions like DNS records are sort of OK, if you only care about basic privacy, but ultimately all of those require trust in a third party--unless you run all of your infrastructure yourself, which most people can't. But That's not good enough for applications where encryption is actually essential, and any feature designed to make it more convenient can only weaken the protection it provides. For example, your ISP can hijack my DNS records if you're using their DNS servers. MITM is a huge problem that OpenPGP solves, but only if you use it properly. -- Derek D. Martin http://www.pizzashack.org/ GPG Key ID: 0xDFBEAD02 -=-=-=-=- This message is posted from an invalid address. Replying to it will result in undeliverable mail due to spam prevention. Sorry for the inconvenience.
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