Tom,

Thanks for your perspective. I do appreciate the Hanlon's Razor point — it's a good general principle.

However, in this case, the same ASN also:
- Manually injected China Telecom's IPv6 backbone (`240e::/20`) into its BIRD config on May 1
- Submitted a new ASN (`AS402333`) on May 16, the day of the leak
- Maintains a global geofeed that still lists a Shanghai node as of May 22

If that's not malice, then perhaps it's a very, very advanced form of stupidity.

Either way, the evidence is archived.

me
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