The guys who did the Multics penetration tests for the Air Force have re-released it, with commentary on what 30 years has changed (and more importantly, not changed). Most depressing quote:
Thus, systems that are weaker than Multics are consid-
ered for use in environments in excess of what even Mul-
tics could deliver without restructuring around a security
kernel. There really seem to be only four possible con-
clusions from this: either (1) today's systems are really
much more secure than we claim; (2) today's potential
attackers are much less capable or motivated; (3) the in-
formation being processed is much less valuable; or (4)
people are unwilling or unable to recognize the compel-
ling need to employ much better technical solutions.
http://domino.watson.ibm.com/library/cyberdig.nsf/papers/FDEFBEBC9DD3E35485256C2C004B0F0D/$File/RC22534.pdf
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