Thank you very much, but no.
DNS (and DNSSEC) relies on working IP transport for its operation.
Now you effectively propose to make routing (and so operation of IP
transport) dependent on DNS(SEC).
Am I the only one who sees the problem?
--vadim
PS. The only sane method for routing info validation I've seen so far is
the plain old public-key crypto signatures.
On 1 Mar 2003, Paul Vixie wrote:
>
> > It wouldn't be too hard for me to trust:
> >
> > 4969.24.origin.0.254.200.10.in-addr.arpa returning something like "true."
> > to check whether 4969 is allowed to originaate 10.200.254.0/24. ...
>
> at last, an application for dnssec!
- Re: Who uses RADB? [was BGP to doom us all... Neil J. McRae
- Re: Who uses RADB? [was BGP to doom us all... jlewis
- RE: Who uses RADB? [was BGP to doom us... Michael Hallgren
- Re: Who uses RADB? [was BGP to doom us all... Richard A Steenbergen
- Re: Who uses RADB? [was BGP to doom us... Jeffrey Meltzer
- RE: BGP to doom us all Jim Deleskie
- Re: BGP to doom us all Bruce Pinsky
- Re: BGP to doom us all Rob Thomas
- Re: BGP to doom us all Avi Freedman
- Re: BGP to doom us all Paul Vixie
- Re: BGP to doom us all Vadim Antonov
- Re: BGP to doom us all Christopher L. Morrow
- Re: BGP to doom us all bmanning
- Re: BGP to doom us all Iljitsch van Beijnum
- Re: BGP to doom us all Jack Bates
- RE: BGP to doom us all Paul Ferguson
- Re: BGP to doom us all Avi Freedman
- Re: BGP to doom us all Avi Freedman
- Re: BGP to doom us all Iljitsch van Beijnum
- Re: BGP to doom us all Jack Bates
- Re: BGP to doom us all E.B. Dreger
