Subject: RE: On the back of other 'security' posts.... Date: Sat, Aug 30, 2003 at 11:51:02PM -0700 Quoting Owen DeLong ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > > > That depends on your definition of edge, I suppose. I define it as the > port on one of my routers where the other end of the link is connected > to a machine I don't control. In those terms, edge filtering makes sense > in some cases and not in others. If it's a dial-up or T1 customer which is > a single business, it makes sense. If it's an ISP with a few fortune 500 > customers, it doesn't work out as well.
I'd go with Chris view here. Let me try to define why I think so:
A device[0] on the network should:
* Protect themselves against external[1] threat.
* Enforce sense and order in what they allow.
* Only try protecting others when they have full knowledge of what
they are protecting.
This leads to:
* Only trust authenticated logins, do as much as possible away with
using the network address as a authenticator, except for trivial
stuff like perhaps printing.
* Stop spoofing by filtering routing.
- It is not rocket science to put spoofing filters on CPEs.
- More complex in backbones or in multi homed setups.
- Enforce some kind of prefix/AS path checks on peerings.
Routers know this, and excel at routing or not. They sometimes
suck at dropping packets (at least in a controlled fashion).
* Filter on the host, where knowledge is maximal (Which hosts do I
want to talk to, and by which means?) and collateral damage is
minimal (no other activities on other hosts are blocked)
* Do not impose general blocks over large user bases. The resulting
productivity hit, coupled with the mess of exceptions to be
managed will cause more trouble than is won by blocking.
* Be prepared to reevaluate in crisis situations.
--
M�ns Nilsson Systems Specialist
+46 70 681 7204 KTHNOC
MN1334-RIPE
I just remembered something about a TOAD!
[0] Any IP-speaking box, be it router, switch, host.
[1] meaning anything not in my box, coming from LAN or console.
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