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We actually accept up to the customers aggregate. So if they have a
/16, they can tag the whole /16. And we do not tag no-export. I saw
some time ago on a list, and I think Bill Manning suggested it, that if
you are getting bits for unused address space, to announce that address
space (up to host specific) with the DDoS community string. That keeps
the packets off of your link and thus you don't get charged for them.
The same can be done in reverse. We have a customer that is
advertising their larger block with the DDoS community string, and then
advertising the addresses they are actually using more specifically, so
we blackhole everything less specific. These are a couple of
applications that can be utilized if you don't tag no-export and accept
more than just /32's within their address space. FWIW. Also, we are utilizing Juniper's DCU for tracebacks, which makes life MUCH easier when tracing an attack. :-) SNMP polling the DCU counters every few minutes is relatively fast and painless, and provides quick results. Mark Lumenello, Jason wrote: Oh, and I strip their communities, and apply no-export, on the first term of my route map so the /32 does not get out. Of course my peer facing policy requires specific communities to get out as well (belt and suspenders).This method works very well, and you do not have to give up length restrictions or maintain two sets of customer prefix/access lists. Jason-----Original Message----- From: Lumenello, Jason Sent: Wednesday, March 03, 2004 4:52 PM To: 'Stephen J. Wilcox'; james Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS I struggled with this, and came up with the following. We basically use a standard route-map for all customers where thefirst |
- Re: Source address validat... Paul Vixie
- Re: Source address validat... Christopher L. Morrow
- Re: Source address validat... Paul Vixie
- Re: Source address validat... E.B. Dreger
- Re: UUNet Offer New Protec... Alex Bligh
- RE: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS Lumenello, Jason
- Re: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS Patrick W . Gilmore
- Re: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS Alex Bligh
- Re: UUNet Offer New Protection Against ... Avleen Vig
- RE: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS Lumenello, Jason
- RE: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS Mark Kasten
- RE: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS Lumenello, Jason
- Re: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS Deepak Jain
- RE: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS Lumenello, Jason
- RE: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS Lumenello, Jason
- RE: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS Terranson, Alif
- RE: UUNet Offer New Protection Against DDoS Terranson, Alif
