On Dec 4, 2005, at 8:04 PM, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
"Church, Chuck" writes:
The ideal solution would be for the scanning software to send a
warning only if the virus detected is known to use real addresses,
otherwise it won't warn.
A-V companies are in the business of analyzing viruses. They
should *know* how a particular virus behaves.
It is common to find detailed descriptions offered by the company
that indicates the behavior of the detected virus, which often
includes spoofing the bounce-address. A less than elegant solution
as an alternative to deleting the message, is to hold the data phase
pending the scan. Another solution would be not returning message
content within a DSN. This would mitigate the distribution of
viruses, as well as forged bounce-addresses sent to a backup MTAs as
a method for bypassing black-hole lists. Would changing what is
returned within a DSN in all cases be a solution?
-Doug
