On Sep 22, 2008, at 9:06 PM, Scott Weeks wrote:
I am hoping to confirm a short-duration prefix hijack of
72.234.0.0/15 (and another of our prefixes) by ASN 8997 ("OJSC North-
West Telecom" in Russia) in using ASN 3267 (Russian Federal
University Network) to advertise our space to ASN 3277 (Regional
University and Scientific Network (RUSNet) of North-Western and
Saint-Petersburg Area of Russia).
Is that what I'm seeing when I go to "bgplay.routeviews.org/bgplay",
put in prefix 72.234.0.0/15 and select the dates:
22/9/2008 9:00:00 and 22/9/2008 15:00:00
If so, am I understanding it correctly if I say ASN 3267 saw a
shorter path from ASN 8997, so refused the proper announcement from
ASN 36149 (me) it normally hears from ASN 174 (Cogent).
I cannot confirm that from the monitoring program at AS 16517 :
[EMAIL PROTECTED] mcast]$ grep 72.234.0.0 bgp.full.Sep_2*2008
bgp.full.Sep_21_00:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
38.101.161.116 3990 0 174 209 36149 ?
bgp.full.Sep_21_06:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
38.101.161.116 3990 0 174 209 36149 ?
bgp.full.Sep_21_12:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
38.101.161.116 3990 0 174 209 36149 ?
bgp.full.Sep_21_18:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
38.101.161.116 3990 0 174 209 36149 ?
bgp.full.Sep_22_00:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
38.101.161.116 3990 0 174 209 36149 ?
bgp.full.Sep_22_06:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
38.101.161.116 3990 0 174 209 36149 ?
bgp.full.Sep_22_12:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
38.101.161.116 3990 0 174 209 36149 ?
bgp.full.Sep_22_18:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
38.101.161.116 3990 0 174 209 36149 ?
bgp.full.Sep_23_00:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
38.101.161.116 3990 0 174 209 36149 ?
bgp.full.Sep_23_06:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
38.101.161.116 3990 0 174 209 36149 ?
You didn't specify the time zone you are in, so I looked at +- 1 day
around it. If the hijack lasted 6 hours, we
should have seen it.
Regards
Marshall
If the above two are correct, would it be correct to say only the
downstream customers of ASN 3267 were affected?
scott
