It's also not effective in various situations. The bad behavior is not disabling abused domains, it's the method used to do it (by giving no answer instead of actively giving a negative answer).
When a http client asks recursive resolver A for an A RR, and no response is received, the client will then go to recursive resolver B and make the very same query again, and possibly on to recursive resolver C. One of the secondary/tertiary recursive resolvers may hand the client a cached response that had been obtained before the registrar took any action. If instead recursive resolver A returned a NXDOMAIN, that would be the end of it, no new queries, the answer has returned name does not exist. The impact of the additional queries can be significant as well. -- -J On Sun, Nov 16, 2008 at 4:38 PM, Andrew Fried <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Chances are if the domain has been sandboxed, it was because it was > involved in some kind of phishing scheme, not spam. This is the > typicaly way of mitigating fast flux botnets. So I don't agree with the > assessment that this is bad behavior on the part of GoDaddy - to the > contrary, they are acting quite responsibly. > > AF >
