On 10/4/22 1:40 PM, [email protected] wrote:
Except the pstn DB isn’t distributed like DNS is.
Yes, I had forgot about "dip" in that sense. But an originating provider
doesn't need to do a dip to know that the calling number routes to
itself. I've been talking about the calling provider not the called
provider all along.
Mike
On Oct 4, 2022, at 2:40 PM, Michael Thomas <[email protected]> wrote:
On 10/4/22 11:21 AM, Shane Ronan wrote:
Except the cost to do the data dips to determine the authorization
isn't "free".
Since every http request in the universe requires a "database dip"
and they are probably a billion times more common, that doesn't seem
like a very compelling concern.
Mike
On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 2:18 PM Michael Thomas <[email protected]> wrote:
On 10/4/22 6:07 AM, Mike Hammett wrote:
I think the point the other Mike was trying to make was that if
everyone policed their customers, this wouldn't be a problem.
Since some don't, something else needed to be tried.
Exactly. And that doesn't require an elaborate PKI. Who is
allowed to use what telephone numbers is an administrative issue
for the ingress provider to police. It's the equivalent to gmail
not allowing me to spoof whatever email address I want. The FCC
could have required that ages ago.
Mike
-----
Mike Hammett
Intelligent Computing Solutions
http://www.ics-il.com
Midwest-IX
http://www.midwest-ix.com
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From: *"Shane Ronan" <[email protected]>
<mailto:[email protected]>
*To: *"Michael Thomas" <[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]>
*Cc: *[email protected]
*Sent: *Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM
*Subject: *Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough
(Robocalls)
The issue isn't which 'prefixes' I accept from my customers,
but which 'prefixes' I accept from the people I peer with,
because it's entirely dynamic and without a doing a database
dip on EVERY call, I have to assume that my peer or my peers
customer or my peers peer is doing the right thing.
I can't simply block traffic from a peer carrier, it's not
allowed, so there has to be some mechanism to mark that a
prefix should be allowed, which is what Shaken/Stir does.
Shane
On Mon, Oct 3, 2022 at 7:05 PM Michael Thomas <[email protected]>
wrote:
The problem has always been solvable at the ingress
provider. The
problem was that there was zero to negative incentive to do
that. You
don't need an elaborate PKI to tell the ingress provider
which prefixes
customers are allow to assert. It's pretty analogous to
when submission
authentication was pretty nonexistent with email... there
was no
incentive to not be an open relay sewer. Unlike email spam,
SIP
signaling is pretty easy to determine whether it's spam.
All it needed
was somebody to force regulation which unlike email there
was always
jurisdiction with the FCC.
Mike
On 10/3/22 3:13 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
> We're talking about blocking other carriers.
>
> On 10/3/22, 3:05 PM, "Michael Thomas" <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On 10/3/22 1:54 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
> > Because it's illegal for common carriers to block
traffic otherwise.
>
> Wait, what? It's illegal to police their own users?
>
> Mike
>
> >
> > On 10/3/22, 2:53 PM, "NANOG on behalf of Michael
Thomas" <[email protected]
on behalf of [email protected]> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 10/3/22 1:34 PM, Sean Donelan wrote:
> > > 'Fines alone aren't enough:' FCC threatens
to blacklist voice
> > > providers for flouting robocall rules
> > >
> > >
https://www.cyberscoop.com/fcc-robocall-fine-database-removal/
> > >
> > > [...]
> > > “This is a new era. If a provider doesn’t
meet its obligations under
> > > the law, it now faces expulsion from
America’s phone networks. Fines
> > > alone aren’t enough,” FCC chairwoman
Jessica Rosenworcel said in a
> > > statement accompanying the announcement.
“Providers that don’t follow
> > > our rules and make it easy to scam
consumers will now face swift
> > > consequences.”
> > >
> > > It’s the first such enforcement action by
the agency to reduce the
> > > growing problem of robocalls since call ID
verification protocols
> > > known as “STIR/SHAKEN” went fully into
effect this summer.
> > > [...]
> >
> > Why did we need to wait for STIR/SHAKEN to do
this?
> >
> > Mike
> >
>
>
