* [email protected] (Matt Corallo) [Sun 17 Nov 2024, 20:44 CET]:
Apologies if it came across as insulting, indeed I wasn't spending
my time reading IETF mailing lists in the early 2010s :). That said,
the reality today is that RPKI trust anchors are perfectly capable
of (through malice or cybersecurity incidents) AS0-routing as much
IP space as they want, taking entire swaths of the internet offline
for a day or more at a time. So even if there was a ton of
hand-wringing about it prior to deployment, that didn't translate
into any best practices which actually reduce the trust the RPKI
system has.
Please take some time to read up on what countermeasures against RIRs
"AS0-routing as much IP space as they want" are being taken by
developers of validators before posting here again.
-- Niels.
