On Fri, Apr 6, 2012 at 1:04 PM, Nick Hilliard <[email protected]> wrote: > On 06/04/2012 18:41, Nathan Eisenberg wrote: >> Anyone else seeing this sort of noise lately? > > There has been a bit of that recently for ripe.net and several other well > known DNSSEC enabled domains (e.g. isc.org). > > It turns out that DNSSEC makes a respectable traffic amplification vector:
This is definitely a problem. Unfortunately, what really should happen is DNSSEC should be revised, to, either make sure that the client initiating the query has to either do more work than the server, or make a round trip before the DNSSEC data can be requested. One way of accomplishing that would be to indicate that DNSSEC data can be transmitted only over DNS when using TCP; since a reflection spoofer cannot complete a 3-way TCP handshake, the attacker cannot send spoofed requests for DNSSEC data over TCP. -- -JH
