On Tue, 26 Mar 2013, Matthew Petach wrote:
The concern Valdis raised about securing recursives while still
being able to issue static nameserver IPs to mobile devices
is an orthogonal problem to Owen putting rate limiters on
the authoritative servers for he.net. If we're all lighting up
pitchforks and raising torches, I'd kinda like to know at which
castle we're going to go throw pitchforks.
BCP38. As you can see from the wandering conversation, there are many
attack vectors that hinge on the ability to spoof the source address, and
thereby misdirect responses to your DDoS target. BCP38 filtering stops
them all. Or, we can ignore BCP38 for several more years, go on a couple
years crusade against open recursive resolvers, then against
non-rate-limited authoratative servers, default public RO SNMP
communities, etc.
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Jon Lewis, MCP :) | I route
| therefore you are
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