You can still potentially access all the same information since it all goes through the load balancer. Interesting bits of info are things like Cookie: headers being sent by clients and sitting in a buffer. Try one of the testing tools mentioned and see if you can see any info from other clients. It's almost like having remote tcpdump on the web server - you can copy down the in-memory process image.
-Laszlo On Apr 8, 2014, at 7:12 PM, "Frank Bulk" <frnk...@iname.com> wrote: > If we would front our HTTPS services with a (OpenSSL vulnerable) > load-balancer that does the SSL work and we just use HTTP to the service, > will that mitigate information loss that's possible with this exploit? Or > will the OpenSSL code on the load-balancer also store or "cache" content? > > Frank > > -----Original Message----- > From: Paul Ferguson [mailto:fergdawgs...@mykolab.com] > Sent: Tuesday, April 08, 2014 12:07 AM > To: NANOG > Subject: Fwd: Serious bug in ubiquitous OpenSSL library: "Heartbleed" > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA256 > > I'm really surprised no one has mentioned this here yet... > > FYI, > > - - ferg > > > > Begin forwarded message: > >> From: Rich Kulawiec <r...@gsp.org> Subject: Serious bug in >> ubiquitous OpenSSL library: "Heartbleed" Date: April 7, 2014 at >> 9:27:40 PM EDT >> >> This reaches across many versions of Linux and BSD and, I'd >> presume, into some versions of operating systems based on them. >> OpenSSL is used in web servers, mail servers, VPNs, and many other >> places. >> >> Writeup: Heartbleed: Serious OpenSSL zero day vulnerability >> revealed >> > http://www.zdnet.com/heartbleed-serious-openssl-zero-day-vulnerability-revea > led-7000028166/ >> >> Technical details: Heartbleed Bug http://heartbleed.com/ >> >> OpenSSL versions affected (from link just above): OpenSSL 1.0.1 >> through 1.0.1f (inclusive) are vulnerable OpenSSL 1.0.1g is NOT >> vulnerable (released today, April 7, 2014) OpenSSL 1.0.0 branch is >> NOT vulnerable OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch is NOT vulnerable >> > > > - -- > Paul Ferguson > VP Threat Intelligence, IID > PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2 > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32) > Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ > > iF4EAREIAAYFAlNDg9gACgkQKJasdVTchbIrAAD9HzKaElH1Tk0oIomAOoSOvfJf > 3Dvt4QB54os4/yewQQ8A/0dhFZ/YuEdA81dkNfR9KIf1ZF72CyslSPxPvkDcTz5e > =aAzE > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > >